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This dissertation consists of two studies that investigate the impact of advertising and 
user-generated content on media bias. The first study analyzes how advertising revenues in 
addition to subscription revenues play a role in affecting the extent of media bias. When making 
advertising choices, advertisers evaluate both the size and the composition of the readership of 
the different outlets. The profile of the readers matters since advertisers wish to target readers 
who are likely to be receptive to their advertising messages. It is demonstrated that when 
advertising supplements subscription fees, it may serve as a polarizing or moderating force, 
contingent upon the extent of heterogeneity among advertisers in appealing to readers having 
different political preferences. When heterogeneity is large, each advertiser chooses a single 
outlet for placing ads (Single-Homing), and greater polarization arises in comparison to the case 
that media relies only on subscription fees for revenues. In contrast, when heterogeneity is small, 
each advertiser chooses to place ads in multiple outlets (Multi-Homing), and reduced 
polarization results. In the second study, a newspaper‟s decision to expand its product line by 
adding an online edition that incorporates user-generated content and the impact of this decision 
on its slanting of news are investigated. It is demonstrated that adding an online edition results in 
reduced profits for competing newspapers in comparison to an environment in which they offer 
only print editions. However, at the equilibrium, each newspaper offers the online version in 
order to avoid losing market share to rivals. 
THE IMPACT OF ADVERTISING AND USER-GENERATED CONTENT ON 
MEDIA BIAS  
 
T. PINAR YILDIRIM, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2012
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1.0  GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) argue that a healthy news media is fundamental for a 
healthy democracy. It is important for public to obtain news that is objective. Yet, bias in news 
media is widely recognized (e.g., Groseclose and Milyo 2005, and Hamilton 2004) and it often 
appears in forms of selective omission, and choice of words, and picking information sources to 
cite.  
Previous research cited a variety of reasons for the existence of media bias, ranging from 
journalists‟ desires to enhance their career opportunities (Baron 2006) to media‟s incentive to 
increase audience ratings (Bernhardt, Krasa and Polborn 2008). In a recent paper by 
Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), a link is established between subscription fees and media bias. 
By assuming that readers prefer news consistent with their beliefs and that newspapers can slant 
toward these beliefs, authors show that when the papers‟ sole source of revenue is from 
subscription fees (i.e., price for news), newspapers slant news  storeries toward extreme 
positions.  Following Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) and 
Xiang and Sarvary (2007) also argued that media bias results from newspapers‟ desires to 
maximize subscription revenues.  To extend and complement these earlier research, this 
dissertation provides two other explanations for why news media might be biased:  the desire to 
maximize advertising revenues (in addition to subscription revenues), and extending product line 
to offer a user-generated content (UGC) enhanced version of a news product.   
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First, advertising revenues can play a significant role in determining the extent of bias 
because for many media outlets revenue comes from advertising as opposed to subscription fees.  
For example, newspapers are traditionally reported to earn 80% of total revenues from 
advertising and 20% from circulation  (Sass 2009). Given this reality, in the first study, we 
extend the investigation of Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) by recognizing that newspapers rely 
on revenues that accrue both from subscription fees paid by readers and advertising fees paid by 
advertisers. We investigate how the existence of these two sources of revenues affect the extent 
of bias in reporting that is selected by the media. Based on the correlation between the advertised 
product and the political opinions of a consumer, we allow the advertisements to have varying 
levels of effectiveness to enhance the probability of buying.  An advertisement that reminds a 
consumer that the product is consistent with his political opinions may increase the likelihood 
that he will purchase the product.  
Second, a newspaper‟s decision to diversify its product mix to offer an online edition 
with UGC can also influence media bias. UGC is becoming increasingly more common in the 
news media, appearing in the forms of comments, blogs, photos, and video news. Such 
integration of user content is also known as “citizen journalism”. For example, in the print 
media, The New York Times and Wall Street journal allow readers to comment on the articles 
and create discussion groups in the online edition of the newspapers. In the broadcast media, 
CNN and Fox News have been disseminating news videos („I-reports‟ and „U-reports‟) that are 
submitted by their audience. Yet, for news companies the impact of extending their product line 
by including an online edition with UGC on media bias and profitability is unknown. To 
investigate this impact, we analyze an environment where only the online editions of newspapers 
offer UGC. Based on recent studies by Miller and Morrison (2009) and Morrison and Miller 
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(2008), we assume that consumers with more extreme opinions have higher appreciation for the 
online editions because of UGC. As a result, diversification of the product mix leads to possible 
segmentation of readers according to their political opinions: readers who are moderates prefer 
the print edition of the newspaper and readers who are extremes subscribe to the online edition 
and can be active in generating content on the newspaper‟s site. 
In analyzing the impact of advertising and UGC on media bias, based on Mullainathan 
and Shleifer (2005), we form two key assumptions about the utility a consumer receives from 
reading news. First, it is assumed that readers prefer news consistent with their political opinions. 
Therefore, a reader of leftwing  (rightwing) political opinions prefer to read news stories with 
leftwing (rightwing) orientation. Second, it is assumed that readers prefer news stories with less 
slant. For example, when news stories presented are equidistant from a reader‟s political opinion, 
his utility from the story with lower slant is higher. These two assumptions together suggest that 
readers show a split personality and carry conflicting goals in acquiring news. Newspapers, in 
exchange, strategically slant toward these opinions.  
 Findings from the first study show that when newspapers rely both on advertising and 
subscription fees, advertising can serve as a polarizing or moderating force in affecting the 
reporting of newspapers through two effects. First, the “readership effect” enables the 
newspapers to charge higher advertising fees by reducing newspapers‟ reliance on subscribers in 
favor of advertisers. As a result, newspapers can afford to have lower slant in their news reports 
and appeal to moderate readers and by doing so, offer a bigger readership to advertisers.  
However, in seeking to lure advertisers, the counter “incremental pricing effect” may arise when 
advertisers choose to Single-Home. Newspapers may have stronger incentives to polarize in 
order to alleviate price competition in both markets.  
  4 
Findings from the second study show that segmentation of readers reduces the extent of 
bias in reporting of the print edition but intensifies the extent of bias of the online edition 
compared to an environment in which newspapers do not diversify their product mix. When 
UGC is added by readers to the online editions, each newspaper is indirectly forced by 
subscribers to offer two differentiated versions of its product. With this added differentiation, the 
profitability of the newspaper declines in comparison to an environment where it has the 
exclusive right to choose the bias of both editions. 
Rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In the following section, the influence of 
advertising revenues on media bias is modeled and explained. Subsequently, the model is 
extended to consider the influence of UGC when subscription is the main source of revenue. The 
proofs for all the proposition, corollaries and lemmas can be found in the Appendix.  
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2.0  THE IMPACT OF ADVERTISING ON MEDIA BIAS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Bias in news media is well known (e.g., Groseclose and Milyo 2005, and Hamilton 2004) 
and can be defined as selective omission, choice of words and varying credibility ascribed to the 
primary source (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006). In a recent paper by Mullainathan and Shleifer 
(MS 2005), a link is established between subscription fees and media bias. By assuming that 
readers prefer news consistent with their political opinions and that newspapers can slant toward 
these opinions, MS (2005) show that when the papers‟ sole source of revenue is from 
subscription fees (i.e., price for news), they slant news toward extreme positions.   
For many media outlets, however, 60% to 80% of total revenue stems from advertising 
(Strömberg 2004), as opposed to subscription. Thus, in this study, we aim to complement the 
work of MS (2005) by recognizing that newspapers rely on revenues that accrue both from 
subscription fees paid by readers and advertising fees paid by advertisers. We investigate how 
the existence of these two sources of revenue affect the extent of bias in reporting that is selected 
by the media. 
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In order to understand the role of advertising in determining the nature of competition 
between newspapers, we specify in the model the effectiveness of advertisements to enhance 
consumers‟ probability of purchase. We argue that this effectiveness, for some products, may 
depend upon the political opinions of readers of the ads. It has been long established in the 
Consumer Behavior literature that products reflect a person‟s self-concept (Belk 1988). They 
provide a way for a person to express her self-image, which may be strongly correlated with her 
political opinions. We introduce, therefore, a product specific variable that measures the extent to 
which political preferences play a role in enhancing consumers‟ probability of purchase of the 
product. While for some products this measure is significant, for others it is trivial.  For example, 
while “green” products, such as Toyota Prius, or Apple‟s Mac computer may appeal more to 
liberals, “American” products, such as the Chevy Truck, may appeal more to conservative 
consumers.  However, there are many products, such as automobile tires or insurance policies, 
for which political opinions do not affect consumers‟ choices to a large extent. 1 When political 
preferences play an important role in consumers‟ purchase decisions, advertising the product can 
be effective if it targets the correct consumers. An advertisement that reminds the consumers that 
the product is consistent with their political opinions may increase the likelihood that they 
purchase the product.  
Heterogeneity among advertisers with respect to the appeal of their products to 
consumers having different preferences is distributed in our model over a bounded interval. The 
length of this interval captures the extent of heterogeneity among advertisers, with longer 
                                                 
1
 The appeal parameter of the advertised product that we introduce in the model assumes a value in the 
vicinity of zero if political preferences do not play an important role in consumers‟ purchase decisions.  
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intervals indicating significant differences in the appeal of products to liberal vs. conservative 
readers. In our model we show that the degree of heterogeneity among advertisers plays a role in 
determining whether advertisers choose to place ads with a single newspaper or with both 
newspapers. The literature on two-sided markets has referred to these two possible outcomes as 
Single and Double-Homing by advertisers, respectively (See Armstrong (2006), for instance.) 
While Single-Homing arises as the unique equilibrium when the extent of heterogeneity is large, 
Double-Homing arises when it is small. 
We further investigate the manner in which the advertisers‟ choice between the 
newspapers affects the slanting strategies of media outlets. We show that when newspapers rely 
both on advertising and subscription fees, advertising can serve as a polarizing or moderating 
force in affecting the reporting of newspapers through two effects. First, adding the advertising 
market implies that newspapers reduce their reliance on subscribers in favor of advertisers. As a 
result, they may choose less slanting in their reporting strategies to improve their appeal to 
moderate readers, and by doing so, offer a bigger readership to advertisers. This “readership 
effect” enables the newspapers to charge higher advertising fees.  
However, in seeking to lure advertisers a second, counter effect may arise when 
advertisers choose to Single-Home. Specifically, when downward pressures on subscription fees 
arise due to reduced slanting of the newspapers, similar downward pressures on advertising fees 
appear, as well, as each newspaper attempts to defend its market share among advertisers. Hence 
newspapers may have stronger incentives to polarize in order to alleviate price competition in 
both markets. This “incremental pricing effect” to polarize is above and beyond the traditional 
attempt of companies to introduce product differentiation in order to soften price competition in 
a given market. Due to the two-sided markets we consider, polarization serves to soften price 
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competition in both markets.We demonstrate that at the Single-Homing equilibrium, the 
“incremental pricing effect” is stronger than the “readership effect”, thus leading to intensified 
bias in reporting. In contrast, at the equilibrium with Double-Homing the “readership effect” is 
the only force present, thus giving rise to reduced bias at the equilibrium. 
There is a growing body of literature on media bias as implied by the media‟s attempt to 
appeal to readers‟ beliefs. In addition to MS (2005), Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) and Xiang 
and Sarvary (2007) also investigate this kind of bias. In Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) readers 
who are uncertain about the quality of an information source infer that the source is of higher 
quality if its reports are consistent with their prior expectations. Xiang and Sarvary assume that 
there are two types of consumers, those who enjoy reading news consistent with their political 
opinions and conscientious consumers who care only about the truth. This assumption is 
different from MS (2005) or our study, where each consumer values both some consistency with 
political opinions and accuracy. The reporting strategy of the newspapers depends then on the 
relative weights consumers assign to consistency with their political opinions vs. accuracy. In 
addition, these earlier studies on bias assume that the media‟s sole source of revenue stems from 
selling news. In contrast, in the present study we allow the papers to earn revenues from 
advertising fees as well.  
There are two recent papers that consider, like us, a media market with both advertising 
and subscription fees as sources of revenue. In Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2002) and 
Ellman and Germano (2009), advertisers care only about the size and not the profile of the 
readership of each newspaper. This assumption is different from our setting, where advertisers 
wish to target audiences that are receptive to their advertising messages. This targeting objective 
of advertisers is pursued in Bergemann and Bonatti (2010) in an environment where the sole 
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source of revenues of media outlets is from advertising. In this recent study, the authors 
investigate how improvements in the targeting technology that is facilitated by online advertising 
affects the allocation of advertisements across different media and the equilibrium prices of 
advertising messages. The topic of targeted advertising is also investigated in Iyer, Soberman, 
and Villas-Boas (2005) in an environment where the firms themselves and not media outlets 
possess the targeting technology. 
Another strand of literature related to our study deals with consumers who may choose 
one or two of competing products. In Sarvary and Parker (1997) consumers decide whether to 
rely on a single information source or to diversify their purchases to include competing sources. 
They show that the segmentation of consumers between those who purchase one or two sources 
of information depends upon the relative importance consumers assign to obtaining precise 
information. In Guo (2006), a similar diversification of the consumption bundle may arise when 
there is uncertainty about future preferences. Buying competing products simultaneously serves 
as “insurance” against such uncertainty. The main difference between our study and the previous 
two is our focus on competition between media outlets in two-sided markets instead of the one-
sided framework considered in these studies.  
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2.2 THE MODEL 
 Consider a market with two newspapers, i=1, 2, a mass of A advertisers and a mass of M 
consumers, where M1 of these consumers are subscribers to one of these two papers and M2 are 
nonsubscribers.  Newspapers provide news and print advertisements.  By simultaneously 
operating in these two markets, newspapers have two potential sources of revenue: subscription 
fees (Pi) and advertising fees (Ki).   
Each of the M1 consumers reads either Newspaper 1 or 2 (but not both), and may buy 
products from the advertisers. We adapt the model developed by MS (2005) to capture the 
interaction between subscribers and newspapers. Specifically, when reading the newspaper, a 
subscriber receives information about a certain news item t, which is distributed according to 
N(0,   
 ). Each consumer has some belief about the news item that is affected by her political 
opinion. We designate this political preference by  , and assume that the consumer believes the 
news item to be distributed according to N(b,  
 ). In comparison to the true distribution of the 
news item, the consumer‟s belief is biased. The political opinion parameter   measures the extent 
and direction of this bias. It is uniformly distributed in the population of readers between –b0 and 
b0. For example, readers with beliefs closer to –b0 can be considered liberals, and those in the 
proximity of b0 can be considered conservatives.  
Newspapers report news about  . They receive some data      , where the random 
variable   is independently distributed of t according to         
  . Note that the data received 
by the newspapers may be different since   and   are random variables. Hence,         
  , 
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where   
    
    
 
 . 
2
Newspapers may choose to report the data with slant   , so the reported 
news is        . Readers incur disutility when reading news inconsistent with their political 
opinions, as measured by the distance between the reported news and the readers‟ opinions: (   -
b)
2
. Holding constant the extent of inconsistency with their opinions, they also prefer less 
slanting in the news. As in MS (2005), the overall utility of a reader is: 
 (1)                           
       
         
                      0, 
Where   is the reservation price of the reader,   calibrates her preference for reduced 
slant, and   calibrates the reader‟s preference for hearing news consistent with her political 
opinion. Note that the utility of the reader increases the smaller the slant   , and the smaller the 
discrepancy between the reader‟s opinion   and the reported news   . 
Similar to MS (2005) we also focus on the characterization of the equilibrium with full 
coverage of the market and linear slanting strategies of the newspapers in the form       
 
 
   
       with    interpreted as a choice of location of newspaper i. In Appendix we show 
the optimality of linear slanting strategies when the newspapers‟ sole source of revenue is from 
subscription fees. However, in our analysis, in which both advertising and subscription fees are 
sources of revenue, we implicitly assume that the linearity of slanting strategies is still valid. 
This location choice of the newspaper can be a point inside or outside of the interval [–b0, b0] and 
reflect the newspaper‟s political preference. Using      , the study slants data toward its 
                                                 
2
 Notice that there is no vertical differentiation between the newspapers in this setting (i.e., the accuracy 
of the data received by both newspapers is identical:    
     
    
 ). In the Web Appendix, we 
demonstrate that our utility specification may also give rise to a tradeoff between vertical and horizontal 
differentiation. Specifically, when    
     
 ,          .  
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preference    when reporting news. Notice that the extent of slanting is an increasing function of 
  and a decreasing function of χ. Hence, as readers derive higher utility from hearing news 
consistent with their political opinions and reduce the importance placed on obtaining accurate 
information, newspapers choose greater slanting in their reporting. Without loss of generality, we 
assume that Newspaper 2 is located to the right of Newspaper 1 (B1 <B2). That is, while 
Newspaper 1 slants more to the left, Newspaper 2 slants more to the right.  
Substituting the linear slanting strategies for    and    into Equation 1 and using the 
distributional properties of the random variable d (specifically, that      and        
 ), 
yields the expected payoff of a consumer having opinion b at the time she chooses between the 
two newspapers. Note that at this time, the realizations of   and       are yet to be determined 
due to the fluctuations of the data supporting news stories. At the time of the choice, the reader is 
aware only of the locations and fees chosen by the newspapers (   and   ) as well as her own 
political opinion  . Since the actual news may fluctuate depending upon the realization of  , in 
evaluating the utility she derives from subscribing to the papers the reader calculates expectation 
over all possible   realizations in Equation 1. For Newspaper   and reader of type   this yields 
the following expected utility.    
   
    
  
   
      
  
  
   
      
     . 
The consumer who is indifferent between the two newspapers satisfies the equation 
   
     
 . Solving this equation for   yields:  
 (2)                                      = 
     
   
 
       
       
 + 
     
 
.     
 Given the expression derived for         the papers‟ subscription revenues are: 
 (3)                            
         
   
  and             
         
   
 . 
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The population of advertisers is distributed according to the appeal of their products to 
consumers having conservative opinions, namely those situated in the positive segment of the 
distribution of opinions. We designate this appeal parameter by   and assume it is uniformly 
distributed on the interval [   ,   ],     0.  Negative values of   indicate products 
unappealing to conservative consumers with opinions in the range [ ,   ], with more negative 
values indicating increased appeal to liberal consumers with opinions in the range [      . 
Positive values of   indicate products having the opposite characteristics, with bigger positive 
values indicating increased appeal to conservatives. Products whose attractiveness to the 
consumer is unlikely to be determined by political opinions assume an   value in the 
neighborhood of zero. Given the above specification, the parameter    can be interpreted as 
reflecting the extent of heterogeneity of the appeal of different products to consumers with 
different political opinions.  
We assume that in the absence of advertising each consumer has a certain probability of 
purchasing a product. This probability can be modified with advertising.  The change in purchase 
probability for a given reader depends on the extent of compatibility between the political 
opinion of the reader (her location b) and the type of the product advertised (its appeal  ). When 
an ad is successfully targeted to enhance compatibility, the reader‟s purchase probability of the 
advertised product increases. However, with lack of compatibility, her purchase probability 
might actually decrease. We designate by         the incremental probability (positive or 
negative) when a reader of political preference   is exposed to an ad related to product  , and 
specify it as: 
(4)               
  
  
 ,    where     .      
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Hence, the effectiveness of advertising is higher when political opinions are more 
consistent with the appeal parameter of the advertised product, measured by the term    in 
Equation 4. Note that the product    is positive for both liberal consumers of products having a 
negative measure of appeal   and conservative consumers of products having a positive measure 
of appeal. The parameter    is a measure of the basic effectiveness of advertising to increase 
consumers‟ purchase probabilities. The change in the probability of purchase        depends 
also upon the extent of compatibility between the variables b and  .  For example, when a liberal 
consumer is exposed to an advertisement of a green product, this will cause an increase in her 
probability of purchasing this product that is above   , which is the basic increase in purchase 
probability when the consumer becomes aware of the product due to the advertisement. 
However, an extremely conservative consumer can respond very negatively to this product in 
which case the change in her purchase probability due to the advertisement        might even 
become negative. According to Equation 4, the change in the purchase probability for extreme 
products and consumers is larger than that for moderate products and consumers. As we mention 
later, when this feature of our model is not valid, some of our results may change, even though 
the strategic effects we identify will continue to operate.
3
 
The specification in (4) implies that an advertiser is likely to pursue two objectives in 
designing its advertising strategy: to obtain a large audience for its ads and to target an audience 
that is receptive to its advertising message. The first component of the advertising response 
                                                 
3
  Let     denote the initial probability of purchase in the absence of advertising by an individual with 
opinion   and    denote the probability of purchase after advertising such that             . In 
order to guarantee that        we assume that                  and         .  Note 
that these parameter restrictions do not conflict with those given in Lemma 1. 
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function motivates the large audience objective and the second motivates the targeting objective. 
Finally, for simplicity, we assume that advertising has the same effect on a subscriber and 
nonsubscribers with whom she shares information about advertised products. This assumption is 
reasonable since subscribers tend to communicate with friends and relatives who normally hold 
similar political opinions.  
The payoff of an advertiser is measured by the average increase in the number of 
consumers likely to buy its product (average incremental probability times the mass of 
consumers  ) net of the advertising fees paid to the newspapers. Hence, when an advertiser of 
appeal parameter   chooses to advertise only in Newspaper 1, its expected payoff as derived 
from the subscribers of Newspaper 1 is given as: 
(5)                                 
 
   
    
  
  
 
      
   
     ,     
if it chooses to advertise only in Newspaper 2 its expected payoff is: 
(6)                              
 
   
    
  
  
 
  
      
     ,    
 
and if it chooses to advertise in both papers its expected payoff is: 
(7)                                                 .      
By choosing to advertise only in Newspaper 1, an advertiser recognizes that subscribers 
to this newspaper tend to have left leaning political opinions, lying in the interval              
where          at the symmetric equilibrium( when         ). For instance, if it 
advertises a green product       in Newspaper 1, it can expect a positive payoff if the 
advertising fee paid to the newspaper (  ) is not too large, given that the average change in these 
readers‟ purchase probability due the advertisement is positive (i.e.,  
 
   
    
  
  
 
 
   
    ). 
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In contrast, by choosing to advertise only in Newspaper 2, the advertiser draws readers who have 
more right leaning opinions, in the interval             . In this case, even though these readers 
become aware of its product (     ), their political preferences are inconsistent with the 
product (     when     and         ), thus possibly leading to a negative expected 
payoff. 
When advertising in both newspapers, an advertiser draws the entire population of 
readers. An advertiser chooses to advertise in a single newspaper   if              and 
         From Equations 5-7 it follows that for this advertiser         for      namely the 
added benefit from advertising in the second newspaper falls short of the fee newspaper   
charges. This may happen if the advertiser‟s product appeals mostly to readers having extreme 
political opinions. Advertising in a newspaper whose readership consists mostly of readers with 
opposing opinions in the political spectrum may not be worthwhile to the advertiser in this case. 
In contrast, an advertiser whose product‟s appeal is not highly correlated with political 
preferences (having an appeal parameter in the neighborhood of zero) may advertise in both 
newspapers since the added benefit from advertising in each paper is likely to be positive for this 
advertiser, implying that                   . The above discussion indicates that the 
population of advertisers can be segmented into at most three intervals as described in Figure 1.  
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        Only Newspaper 1      Both Newspapers                Only Newspaper 2 
  
 
                                                                             
  
Figure 1: Segmentation of the Advertising Market 
 
Advertised products with appeal parameter less than     are advertised only in Newspaper 
1 since the advertisers of these products try to target mostly liberals (from (6)        is an 
increasing function of  , thus if           ,          for all      ).  In contrast, those with 
appeal parameter bigger than     are advertised only in Newspaper 2, since advertisers wish to 
reach only conservative readers for such high values of appeal parameter (from (5)        is a 
decreasing function of  , thus if          ,          for all      ).  For intermediate 
values of            , advertisers choose to advertise in both newspapers (since both       and 
      are positive in this range). The number of segments in Figure 1 can be smaller than three. 
If        , no advertiser chooses to advertise in both newspapers (referred to in the literature on 
two-sided markets as Single-Homing) and if          and        all advertisers choose to 
advertise in both newspapers, (Double-Homing). Note, in particular that when     , the mass 
of   advertisers is located at    , and in this case, advertisers do not care about targeting. At 
the symmetric equilibrium, from Equations 5 and 6 each advertiser derives the net benefit of  
   
 
   when placing an ad with either one of the newspapers. Double-Homing is obviously 
implied, given that both newspapers offer the same net benefit to each advertiser. 
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From Equations 5-7 we can derive the expressions for     and     as functions of the 
locations and advertising fees chosen by the newspapers as follows:  
(8)            
   
          
 
 
     
            
    ,      
   
          
 
    
     
            
 . 
The appeal parameter     (   ) characterizes an advertiser who is indifferent between 
advertising in Newspaper 1(2) and advertising in both newspapers (i.e.,           and 
         ).  
In the Single-Homing equilibrium, the interior segment of Figure 1 disappears and the 
advertiser who is indifferent between Newspaper 1 and 2 can be derived from Equations 5 and 6 
by solving for   in the equation            : 
 (9)                          
         
   
        
  
   
   
 
   
        
  
       
 
. 
From Equation 9 we obtain the advertising revenues that accrue to the newspapers in the 
equilibrium with Single-Homing as follows: 
(10)                                 
          
   
  and            
          
   
.   
When some advertisers Double-Home, the segment of the market covered by Newspaper 
1 is               and that covered by Newspaper 2 is              . As a result, the 
advertising revenues of the newspapers are: 
 (11)                                         
     
   
  and            
     
   
.  
In what follows we will derive symmetric equilibria with the market of advertisers fully 
covered. At such equilibria,           ,  and         . We will focus on two possible 
cases: equilibrium with Single-Homing, where each advertiser chooses to advertise in a single 
newspaper (          in Figure 1); and Double-Homing,
 
where all advertisers choose to 
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Double-Home (              ). We formulate the decision process of the newspapers as a 
two stage game. In the first stage, each newspaper simultaneously announces a strategy si (d) of 
how to report the news (its location    . In the second stage, the papers choose their prices Pi  
and Ki  simultaneously. Subsequent to those two stages, advertisers choose where to advertise 
and readers decide to which newspaper to subscribe. Next, papers receive data d and report news 
d +si (d). Finally, consumers read the news, get exposed to the advertisements, and form new 
impressions of the advertised products. 
Using this framework but with no advertising, MS (2005) show that the equilibrium 
locations of the newspapers are   
          and    
        . Hence, with subscription 
fees being the only source of revenues of newspapers, extreme bias in reporting, to the right by 
Newspaper 2 and to the left by Newspaper 1, are chosen at the equilibrium. Such extreme 
differentiation in reporting alleviates the extent of competition on subscription fees. In what 
follows, we investigate how these equilibrium locations change if newspapers earn revenues 
from advertising as well. 
It may be interesting to point out how bias in reporting as a vehicle to introduce 
differentiation between newspapers is different from other product features aimed at achieving 
horizontal differentiation. First, the utility of readers depends upon two different attributes of 
news reports, accuracy and consistency with political opinions, thus introducing potentially 
opportunities for both vertical and horizontal differentiation. While the location choice of each 
newspaper (  ) is the vehicle to introduce horizontal differentiation, the weight assigned to this 
location in designing the slanting strategy (i.e., 
 
   
) captures the relative importance of the 
vertical versus the horizontal attributes (i.e., accuracy vs. consistency with political opinions) in 
the utility function of the consumers. In particular, if the consumers‟ appreciation for accuracy 
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(the vertical attribute) is infinite, the papers stop slanting the news and don‟t use reporting bias 
for horizontal differentiation. Another aspect that distinguishes bias from traditional models of 
horizontal differentiation is that newspapers attempt to appeal to two different audiences, readers 
and advertisers. Hence, the positioning of each newspaper has implications for price competition 
in both markets. This contrasts with most models of product differentiation, where features are 
chosen by taking into account competition in a single consumer market. 
 
2.3 ANALYSIS 
 When both subscription and advertising revenues are available, the objectives of the 
newspapers are: 
  
 Single-Homing (          ) 
(12)     
         
   
     
         
   
   ,          
         
   
     
         
   
   ;  
where        and         are given in Equations 2 and 9,  respectively.  
 
 Double-Homing (               ) 
(13)                       
         
   
   ,              
         
   
   ;    
where        is given by Equation 2. 
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The newspapers choose subscription and advertising fees in the second stage to maximize 
Objectives 12-13. When the newspapers locate symmetrically so that         , the 
solution to the maximization is as follows: 
Single-Homing (          ) 
 (14)                            
  
 
 
      
   
 
    
  
 
,        
  
 
 
    
 
.   
Double-Homing (               ) 
 (15)                        
  
 
 
      
   
 
    
  
 
 ,         
  
 
 
 
 
    
  
 
  .    
Hence, for a fixed symmetric choice of locations, subscription fees are higher if 
subscribers have greater preference for reports that are consistent with their  political opinions 
(bigger  ), smaller preference for accurate reporting (smaller  ),  and are more heterogeneous 
(bigger   ). Subscription fees are also higher when the advertising market is smaller (smaller A), 
the relative size of the population of subscribers is bigger (bigger      ), and the effectiveness 
of advertising declines (smaller   ). In general, the more important advertising revenues in 
comparison to subscription revenues, the lower the fees newspapers charge to subscribers at the 
symmetric equilibrium.  
Substituting the equilibrium advertising fees derived in Equations 14 and 15 back into 
Equation 8 implies different types of homing depending on the extent of heterogeneity among 
the advertisers (value of   ).  While for large values (       ), Single-Homing is the unique 
equilibrium, for small values (          , Double-Homing is the unique equilibrium. Note 
that between       and     there is an equilibrium in which while some advertisers Single-
Home (place their ads in a single newspaper), others Double-Home (place ads in both outlets). 
As well, multiple equilibria may arise in this range (see Appendix for derivations.) As explained 
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earlier, advertisers in our environment care both about the number and profile of readers who are 
exposed to their ads. When heterogeneity among advertisers is significant, targeting readers who 
are compatible with advertised products is very important to the advertisers. Single-Homing is 
more successful than Double-Homing in achieving such targeting.  In the absence of targeting, 
ads might reach consumers with extreme political opinions incompatible with the products 
advertised. When heterogeneity is large, such lack of targeting is especially costly for advertisers 
since the product    might assume very large negative values in Equation 4. To obtain the 
equilibrium locations chosen by the newspapers in the first stage, one has to solve first for the 
second stage fees,           and          , as functions of arbitrary location choices selected in 
the first stage (not necessarily symmetric locations only). The second stage equilibrium strategies 
have to be substituted back into Equations 12-13 to obtain the first stage payoff functions of the 
newspapers.  
Assuming the existence of an interior equilibrium, next we compare the locations 
selected at the symmetric equilibrium (designated by    )  to those derived when newspapers 
obtain revenues from subscribers only (denoted as    
     
     ). When there is no 
heterogeneity among advertisers, namely when     , advertisers Double-Home and  
   
         , meaning that bias remains unaffected when advertising is added as a source of 
revenue. However, when     , adding advertising to supplement subscription fees may 
moderate or intensify bias. In Lemma 1, we first derive restrictions on the parameters of the 
model to guarantee that those regimes can be supported with positive streams of revenues from 
subscribers (namely that       and      ). For ease of presentation, we introduce a measure 
for the importance of advertising relative to subscription as a source of revenue for the papers, 
                   
   , where         represents the size of the advertising market 
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relative to the subscription market and             is a measure of the importance consumers 
attach to accuracy relative to consistency with their political opinions. If consumers attach great 
importance to accurate reporting (i.e.,          is large), the papers cannot charge high 
subscription fees. Hence, if either one of the two components of T increases, the subscription 
market loses its importance as a source of revenues relative to the advertising market.  
 
LEMMA 1.  To ensure positive subscription prices and strict differentiation between 
newspapers (i.e.,        and  
    ): 
 (i) At the Single-Homing equilibrium:       
  
   
          
            
,  and        . 
(ii) At the Double-Homing equilibrium:        
  
  
          
           
, and         .  
Restricting attention to the regions specified in Lemma 1, we derive the optimal locations 
chosen by the newspapers at the symmetric equilibrium in Equations 16 and 17.  
Single-Homing  
(16)   
     
     
   
   
 
 
    
 
 
 
  
   
 
  
   
   
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
  
   
  
 
 
    
    
    
   
  
   
 . 
Double-Homing  
(17)     
      
     
   
   
 
  
  
   
   
   
 
  
  
   
 
 
       .                                             
Proposition 1 follows from the expressions derived in Equations 16 and 17. 
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PROPOSITION 1.  With both advertising and subscription fees contributing to the newspapers’ 
revenues, 
(i) When heterogeneity among advertisers is sufficiently large (      ):  
Each advertiser chooses a single newspaper for placing its ads (Single-Homing), and 
newspapers introduce more bias in their reporting (   
      ). This bias increases as 
the importance of advertising as a source of revenue increases ( 
   
  
  
  ). 
(ii) When heterogeneity among advertisers is sufficiently small (        ):Each 
advertiser chooses both newspapers for placing its ads (Double-Homing), and newspapers 
introduce less bias in their reporting (  
      ). This bias decreases as the importance of 
advertising as a source of revenue increases ( 
   
  
  
  ). 
 
To understand the results reported in Proposition 1, it is important to highlight the new 
effects influencing the location choice of the newspapers that arise when advertising is added as 
a source of revenues to supplement subscription fees. The first “readership effect” relates to the 
intensified incentives of each newspaper to increase its readership (for Newspaper 1 this means 
increasing       , and for Newspaper 2 decreasing it). Note that at the symmetric equilibrium 
(when         ) 
   
 
       
 
   
   
   and 
   
 
       
 
   
   
  .4  Hence, irrespective of the type of 
homing, a newspaper that delivers a bigger readership can command a higher advertising fee  
                                                 
4
 The solution for the advertising fees as functions of the locations are:   
    
     
        
  
   
  
        
   
 ,   
    
     
        
  
   
  
        
   
   and   
  
            
   
    
             
   
 ,   
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from advertisers. This implies that each newspaper has extra incentives to move closer to its 
competitor‟s location in order to increase its market share among readers (e.g., 
       
   
 
 
 
   at 
symmetry, when       ).  
 Adding advertising as a source of revenue introduces, though, a second counter force 
when advertisers Single-Home. We refer to this force as the “incremental pricing effect” to 
capture the idea that a change in a newspaper‟s location does not only have a direct effect on the 
intensity of price competition in the subscription market but may also have an indirect, 
incremental effect on the intensity of price competition in the advertising market. Note that this 
effect does not exist in standard models of horizontal differentiation in which a change in 
location has implications on price competition in only one market. When a newspaper modifies 
its location and advertisers Single-Home, the competing newspaper may have to adjust its 
advertising fee in order to defend its market share among advertisers. For instance, when 
Newspaper 1 increases   , it moves closer to the location of Newspaper 2, and due to reduced 
differentiation, Newspaper 2 is forced to cut subscription fees . In addition, since the new, 
moderated location of Newspaper 1 offers a larger readership to advertisers, Newspaper 2 has to 
cut its advertising fee as well in order to defend its market share in the advertising market.
 5 
The 
existence of this “incremental pricing effect” introduces, therefore, incentives for Newspaper 1 to 
polarize in order to discourage aggressive pricing by Newspaper 2. These incentives are stronger 
than in an environment where newspapers compete in a single, subscriber market because 
                                                 
5
 As Newspaper 1 increases its readership by increasing   , Newspaper 2 loses market share among 
advertisers  since at the symmetric equilibrium 
       
       
 
   
  
   .  Thus,   Newspaper 2 has an incentive 
to cut its advertising fee since 
   
 
   
  
   
   
   at symmetry.   
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Newspaper 2 is forced to cut both its advertising and subscription fees. According to part (i) of 
Proposition 1, the “incremental pricing effect” present at the Single-Homing equilibrium more 
than outweighs the objective of increasing readership, thus leading to intensified bias at the 
equilibrium when advertising is added as a source of revenues to augment subscription fees.  
Moreover, this bias increases as the importance of advertising as a source of revenue ( ) 
increases. In contrast, according to part (ii) of the Proposition, at the equilibrium with Double-
Homing, bias in reporting the news is reduced when advertising supplements subscription fees. 
At this type of equilibrium, the only additional effect that advertising introduces is the added 
objective of newspapers to offer bigger readerships to advertisers. Since the market share of each 
newspaper in the advertising market is fixed at 100% and the newspapers don‟t need to defend 
their market shares among advertisers, the “incremental pricing effect” is non-existent in the 
Double-Homing environment.  Note that the “readership effect” intensifies, in this case, when 
advertising is a more important source of revenue (large  ). Figure 2 depicts the relationship 
between the equilibrium locations of the newspapers and the importance of advertising as a 
source of revenue to the newspapers, as reported in Proposition 1.  
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Locations as a Function of T 
 
Note that with a different advertising response function, which implies that the change in 
purchase probability for moderate products and consumers is larger than that for extreme 
products and consumers, the readership effect will be stronger, since in this case, the moderate 
readers will be more valuable for the advertisers, and therefore the newspapers. We predict that 
while the results for Double-Homing reported in Proposition 1 will continue to hold in such an 
environment, the results for Single-Homing may change as the readership effect may outweigh 
the incremental pricing effect. 
We can use the results reported in Proposition 1 to conjecture how the equilibrium is 
likely to change in case of less than full coverage of readers. At the Single-Homing equilibrium 
(when    is big) bias in reporting is significant. Hence, it is sensible that when the market is less 
than fully covered, it is consumers with moderate opinions in the neighborhood of b=0 who 
 
 
   
 
  
   
  
   
 
   
                   
 
 
      
 
   
  28 
choose to drop out of the market     
    for such consumers). As a result, the subscribers of 
each newspaper are fewer in number and have more extreme beliefs in comparison to a fully 
covered market. This new composition of subscribers reduces even further the benefit from 
Double-Homing. In the Appendix, we demonstrate that newspapers may have reduced incentives 
to polarize as a result of incomplete coverage of the subscriber market. In fact, when the 
reservation price of readers is relatively low and their valuation of accurate reporting is high, bias 
is more moderate than that derived in MS (i.e., smaller than 
 
 
  ) even though advertisers Single-
Home. At the Double-Homing equilibrium (when    is small) bias is moderate. It is now 
consumers with very extreme opinions who are likely to drop out of the market. The population 
of subscribers becomes less heterogeneous, as a result, thus enhancing the benefit from Double-
Homing. In the Appendix, we demonstrate, that in this case as well, incomplete coverage may 
moderate the extent of bias selected by the newspapers if the reservation price of readers (and 
their valuation of accuracy) is low (high), respectively. 
 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
In this study we extend the work of MS (2005) by investigating media bias when 
advertising is added as a source of revenue to supplement subscription fees. We show that the 
additional advertising market introduces two counteracting effects on the behavior of 
newspapers. First, as newspapers attempt to increase their readership in order to attract 
advertisers, they moderate slanting in order to appeal to readers having moderate opinions. 
Second, when advertisers choose to Single-Home a second effect arises that may lead to greater 
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polarization in news reporting. If newspapers moderate bias in this case they are forced to 
compete more aggressively not only for subscribers, but for advertisers as well. Downward 
pressure on subscription as well as advertising fees follows. To avoid such intensified price 
competition, newspapers may choose to increase polarization. We demonstrate that when the 
heterogeneity among advertisers in appealing to consumers with different political preferences is 
significant, the attempt to alleviate price competition dominates, thus leading to greater 
polarization. When this heterogeneity is negligible, reduced polarization is predicted. 
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3.0  USER-GENERATED CONTENT AND BIAS IN NEWS MEDIA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
User-generated content (UGC) is increasingly common in the online economy, often 
appearing in forms of blogs, wikis, podcasts, pictures, videos and social networks (Lee 2008). In 
2008, 42.8% of Internet users (82.5 million people) contributed to some form of UGC; and it is 
expected that this number will reach 51.8% by 2012 (114.5 million people) (Verna 2009). In the 
case of news media, use of websites to integrate user content has intensified. For example, the 
Wall Street Journal (WSJ), on its online version, offers readers the opportunity to add content 
under the section titled “Journal Community”. In this digital platform, readers create groups 
having particular interests (e.g. “The Mideast,” “The New Regulation Economy,” “American 
Views on European Politics”, etc.) and share opinions on the subject. In addition, using this 
platform, news readers can make comments or ask questions about stories published by WSJ 
journalists.  The New York Times (NYT), on its digital version, publishes news stories and 
opinions of readers in the form of letters and op-eds, and has a separate „Public Editor‟ assigned 
in charge of responding to comments and opinions of readers. CNN and Fox News have been 
broadcasting news videos (called „I-reports‟ and „U-reports‟) that are submitted by their 
audience. For these news companies, the impact of UGC on profitability is unknown, as it can be 
a substitute to the professionally prepared content. A report by Accenture confirms this concern 
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by arguing that media owners see UGC as the biggest threat to the survival of their businesses 
(Accenture 2007). In this study we investigate a newspaper‟s decision to extend its product line 
to include an online edition that incorporates UGC. Specifically, we are interested in the impact 
of this decision on bias of reported news as well as the role of UGC in determining the extent of 
this reporting bias and newspapers‟ profits.  
We demonstrate that the segmentation of readers reduces the extent of bias in reporting of 
the print edition but intensifies the extent of bias of the online edition. This intensified bias is 
mostly generated by the readers themselves as they add news stories and opinions to the online 
edition. In fact, we demonstrate that if newspapers could completely prevent readers from adding 
UGC to their online editions, they would choose bias to be identical in their print and online 
editions. In contrast, when UGC is added by readers to the online editions, each newspaper is 
indirectly forced by subscribers to offer two differentiated versions of its product. With this 
added differentiation, the profitability of the newspaper declines in comparison to an 
environment where it has the exclusive right to choose the bias of both editions. 
In our model the main characteristic that distinguishes the online edition of a newspaper 
from its print edition is the ability of readers to add UGC to the former variant. We assume that 
this feature of the online edition is especially appreciated by readers who have extreme political 
opinions. We conjecture that such readers have a stronger desire to be heard and/or convince 
other readers of their views.  This assumption is consistent with recent research in psychology 
that investigates how people‟s opinions deviate from that of the average group member.  
Morrison and Miller (2008), for instance, show that people whose opinions are extreme in the 
direction of the norm that reflects the common attitudes of their group (e.g., liberal positions for 
college students), are more likely to express their opinions than moderates. As a result of the 
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added appreciation of some consumers for UGC, the diversification of the product mix leads to 
possible segmentation of readers according to their political opinions.  Readers who are 
moderates prefer the print edition of the newspaper. In contrast, readers who are extreme in their 
opinions opt for the online edition and can be active in generating content on the newspaper‟s 
site.
 6
  
It is noteworthy that the reduced profitability that is predicted in our model at the 
equilibrium when each newspaper adds an online version stems from two characteristics of our 
formulation. First, the extension of the product mix results in reduced bias of the print editions of 
the newspapers, translating to reduced product differentiation and intensified competition on 
subscription fees. Second, since the extent of slant of the online editions is partly determined by 
subscribers, the ability of the newspapers to extract consumer surplus via price discrimination is 
restricted. Several recent empirical findings in the literature support the reduced profitability our 
model predicts.  In particular, Filistrucchi (2005) and Gentzkow (2007) find that adding an 
                                                 
6
 A separate analysis we conducted provides further support for this segmentation by comparing reader 
comments in WSJ online with those in the print edition of WSJ (i.e., Letters to the Editor). Our data set 
comprised of all the online and offline subscriber comments to 46 articles on Health Care Reform that 
appeared between 1-1-10 and 1-31-11 in the print edition. In the print edition, there were 132 Letters to 
the Editor written by 130 readers and in the online edition there were 5818 comments made by 2030 
subscribers. Two raters independently rated all the comments using a 7 point rating scale with 1 (7) 
representing strong support for liberal (conservative) policies. Correlation between the scores of the two 
raters was positive and statistically significant:        (        for Letters to the Editor, and 
       (      ) for online comments. In order to determine a political opinion rating for a reader, for 
each article we first calculated the average score of the two raters. Then, as some readers provided 
comments to more than one article, we calculated overall political rating of a reader by taking the average 
of her (rater-averaged) ratings across all of the articles. Using this procedure the obtained mean ratings 
were 5.27 and 4.82 for the online and print commentators, respectively.  Further, the difference between 
these ratings was statistically significant (                  .  
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online version reduces print sales and profits. Even though those studies demonstrate this finding 
in an environment where access to online content is free, our model predicts that profits decline 
even when newspapers charge for access to their online editions. 
Given our goal of investigating the role of UGC in affecting political bias in news 
reporting, our model focuses primarily on the political opinions of readers as the sole 
determinant of their choice between the print and online editions. There are obviously many 
other attributes that distinguish consumers who prefer one edition over the other. Online users 
are likely to be younger or have higher valuation for the technological features provided by 
online newspapers (such as content sharing-digging, mobile applications, and so on). In an 
extension of our model we incorporate a second dimension of heterogeneity, unrelated to politics 
that differentiates among readers. We show that this additional heterogeneity leads to increased 
bias of the print edition and to a reduction of the average size of the online segment. Essentially, 
this additional heterogeneity moves the equilibrium closer to the outcome that arises when 
newspapers have full control over the attributes of both variants of their products. 
 To formulate the competition between the newspapers, we extend a model that was 
developed by Mullainathan and Shleifer (MS 2005). In this model, consumers prefer reading 
news consistent with their opinions and two newspapers can slant their reporting of the news 
towards these opinions. This assumption is consistent with recent experimental evidence of 
ideological selectivity in media use (see Iyengar and Hahn 2009).  As in MS (2005), we assume 
that the only source of revenues of the newspapers is from subscription fees. Even though 
advertising is also an important source of revenue, in recent years newspapers have reduced their 
reliance on advertising, as more advertisers switch to Internet advertising. In 2009, the NYT 
reported, for instance, that its revenues from circulation surpassed advertising revenues for the 
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first time (Chittum 2009). We assume that the newspapers can charge subscription fees for both 
their print and online editions. The WSJ, for instance, has different subscription fees for print and 
online subscriptions, and the NYT has recently announced that it will start charging for access to 
its online edition in 2011.  
Our study contributes to several strands of literature. First is the literature on media bias 
that is implied by the media‟s attempt to appeal to consumers who have different opinions. 
Mullainathan and Shleifer (MS 2005) investigate the relationship between newspaper 
competition on subscription fees and such bias. In Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) bias occurs 
since media firms slant their reports toward consumer priors in order to maintain reputation for 
high quality reporting. Xiang and Sarvary (2007) examine media bias in the presence of 
conscientious consumers who seek the truth.  Finally, first study of the dissertation analyzes 
slanting in news media when advertisers wish to target readers who are receptive to their 
messages. None of these studies addresses, however, the question of how introducing an online 
edition to supplement a print edition is likely to affect the extent of slant in reporting of news. 
The second strand of literature to which this study contributes deals with how competing 
sellers choose the breadth of their product lines in order to facilitate improved segmentation. 
Some of this literature assumes exogenous product attributes (e.g., Brander and Eaton 1984, 
Gilbert and Matutes 1993).  Our work is more similar to the literature that examines product line 
rivalry when product characteristics are endogenously chosen (e.g., Katz 1984, Moorthy 1987, 
Champsaur and Rochet 1989, Desai 2001, Schmidt-Mohr and Villas-Boas 2008). In contrast to 
this literature on competitive product line design, in our study the enrichment of the product line 
occurs by active participation of customers in determining the (non-price) characteristics of the 
products included in the line. 
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Finally, our study contributes also to literature related to UGC.  There has been 
significant amount of research that involves empirical measurement of the effects of UGC on 
sales (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006, Liu 2006, Dhar and Chang 2009, and Zhu and Zhang 2010) 
and on other similar variables such as TV ratings (Godes and Mayzlin 2004) or new customer 
acquisition (Trusov et al. 2009). However, analytical work in this area has been limited.  Further, 
all such work has addressed UGC in the context of the exchange of information about products 
among online readers (e.g., Mayzlin 2006, Chen and Xie 2008, Kuksov and Shachar 2010). In 
contrast, our research focuses on UGC in generating news reports online. 
 
3.2 THE MODEL 
Consider a market with two newspapers,      , where each can decide on whether to 
add an online version to supplement the print version of its publication. We assume that due to 
technological advancement, the online version facilitates far greater capabilities for the readers to 
add content to the publication than the print version. For simplicity, we assume that only the 
online version can incorporate readers‟ input. We will refer to the activity of readers on the 
online version as User-Generated Content (UGC). We assume that the only source of revenues of 
the newspapers is from subscription fees, and that the unit cost of offering the print version is 
higher than the online version.  We designate by   and   , with      , the unit cost incurred 
by the newspaper to produce the print and online versions, respectively. The added cost of the 
print version may relate, for instance, to added distribution costs. Consumers choose whether to 
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subscribe to the print or online versions of one newspaper. 
7
 We assume that customers who have 
extreme political opinions are likely to be attracted to the greater capabilities offered by the 
online version to share stories and opinions with other readers. Hence, in our model customers 
are segmented according to the intensity of their political opinions. Those who have more 
moderate opinions choose the print version, since they do not plan to engage in UGC, and those 
who have extreme opinions choose the online version since they value the UGC feature of this 
medium.
8
  
To capture the heterogeneity of customers according to political opinions we adopt the 
model developed by MS (2005). Specifically, there is a unit mass of consumers who are 
uniformly distributed according to their political opinions, designated by b, on the interval [-b0 , 
b0]. Readers with left leaning opinions belong to the negative region of this interval and those 
with right leaning opinions belong to the positive region. Information about news items   is 
normally distributed according to N(0,   
 ). Newspapers provide the readers with news about  . 
A reader of type b, has prior beliefs about these news items that is normally distributed according 
to N(b,   
 ).  Hence, in comparison to the true distribution, readers have biased beliefs about the 
news, determined by their political opinions. The variable b measures the extent to which the 
beliefs of the reader are biased relative to the true mean of the distribution of t. 
                                                 
7
 In a recent study, Gentzkow (2007) investigates the newspaper market in Washington DC and 
demonstrates that the print and online versions of newspapers are considered substitutes rather than 
complementary goods by readers. This empirical finding lends some support to our formulation.  
8
 Note that in our model readers with extreme beliefs necessarily contribute to the online content. If the 
utility of readers included an additional argument that relates to benefit derived from influencing others, 
our assumption would be consistent with extremes deriving greater benefit than moderates, and therefore, 
opting to add content to the online editions. It would be interesting to address such an extension in future 
research. 
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Newspapers receive some data    = t +  , where the random variable    is independently 
distributed of t according to    ~N(0,   
 ).  Each newspaper   may choose to slant its reporting so 
that         , where    is the reported news, and    is the slant in reporting. While the 
newspaper has full control over the extent of slanting of its print version, the slant of the online 
version may depend also on the UGC added by subscribers to this product. To allow for the 
possibility of different levels of slanting, we designate by si  and si
o
 the slant of the print and 
online products, respectively, and similarly, by ni  and ni
o
 the reported news in the two variants.  
As in MS (2005), we assume that readers incur disutility when reading news inconsistent 
with their opinions, as measured by the distance between the reported news and the readers‟ 
opinions: (ni -b)
2 
 and (ni
o
 -b)
2
 . As well, holding constant the extent of inconsistency with their 
opinions, readers dislike slanting. When Newspaper i chooses the subscription fees    and    for 
its print and online versions, the net utility of a consumer having opinion b is:  
       (1)       
      
  –         
                                                        
       
    –      
                                                        
   
where   stands for the reservation price of the reader,     calibrates her preference for hearing 
news consistent with her political opinions, and      calibrates her preference for reduced 
slant. Using the utility framework in (1), readers first choose a newspaper and then decide 
whether to subscribe to the online or print versions of the newspaper, while incorporating the fact 
that the online version includes UGC.   
Similar to MS (2005), we assume full coverage of the market of consumers and focus on 
linear slanting strategies         
 
   
       , where Bi is the location choice of the print 
version of Newspaper  , and represents a focal point around which slanting of the news arises. 
This location choice can be a point inside or outside of the interval [–b0, b0]. By choosing 
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location    the paper becomes more appealing to readers with opinions close to    . Notice that 
the extent of slanting decreases with χ and increases with  . Thus, as readers place more 
importance on receiving accurate information and less importance on hearing confirmatory news, 
newspapers choose lower slanting in their reporting
9
. Without loss of generality, we assume that 
Newspaper 2 is located to right of Newspaper 1 (B1 <B2). That is, while Newspaper 1 has a left-
wing slant, Newspaper 2 has a right-wing slant. 
 Note that in our formulation the slanting depends upon the ex-post realization of the data.  
However, the focal point    is chosen ex-ante. Hence, when the data is very different from the 
ex-ante focal point chosen by the newspaper i, the extent of slanting is big. In contrast, if the data 
is close to the focal point, the extent of slanting is small.  
Since subscribers to the online version are active in generating additional content, the 
political position of the online product reflects both the position of the newspaper and the UGC 
supplied by subscribers to this variant of the product. We designate the combined positioning of 
the online variant of Newspaper i by    
  and specify it as follows:  
     (2)      
           
                         ,                                       
where     
   measures the mean opinion of subscribers to the online version of Newspaper i. 10 
Hence, the modified location of the online version is the sum of the position chosen by the 
newspaper and the mean opinion of subscribers to this product multiplied by a positive fraction    
                                                 
9
 For instance, if   2      
  
 
 and when            
10
 Note that the qualitative results of our analysis are likely to remain unchanged for a more general 
formulation, as long as   
  is an increasing function of the location of the print version and the mean 
political beliefs of the readers who subscribe to the online edition. 
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that measures the extent of discretion of online readers to generate content online. The fact that 
   , reflects the sensible assumption that the effect of the newspaper itself in determining the 
positioning of the online variant is higher than that of its readers.  
It is noteworthy that when readers make their choice among the different media, the 
realization of the data supporting the news stories (the random variable   ) is yet to be 
determined. At the time the reader makes her choice, she is familiar with the subscription fees of 
the newspapers (   and   ), their locations (   and   ), and her own political opinion b. Hence, 
in comparing the different media, the reader evaluates her prior expected utility calculated from 
(1) by integrating over all possible realizations of the random variable    and using the 
distributional properties of    (namely,         and Var    =   
 .) Hence, we obtain:  
       (3)         
 – 
  
     
 
      
 
 
  
     
       
                                        
  
  
     
 
   
    
 
 
  
     
       
                                    
    
Our specification implies that when a newspaper decides to add an online variant to 
supplement its print version, it expands its product mix to consist of two products with differing 
levels of slanting in reporting. According to (2), the slanting in reporting is higher online due to 
the added input supplied by subscribers to this product. The expanded product mix is likely to 
support, therefore, improved segmentation of readers as described in Figure 3, when both 
newspapers offer an expanded product mix. Later we show that such segmentation can indeed 
exist. 
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Online Subscribers   Print Subscribers      Print Subscribers     Online Subscribers 
to Newspaper 1          to Newspaper 1       to Newspaper 2          to Newspaper 2 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
 
Figure 3: Segmentation when Both Newspapers Offer both Print and Online Variants 
 
In the Figure, readers having extreme political opinions (      and         ) choose to 
subscribe to one of the online products and those having moderate opinions (         ) 
choose to subscribe to one of the print products. Since slanting is more extreme online than in the 
print version, it is readers with extreme political opinions who self select to subscribe to the 
product that is more consistent with their extreme preferences. Moreover, since those subscribers 
choose to add UGC to the website of the newspaper, the modified location of the online version 
reflects the extreme opinions of these subscribers. Specifically, 
(4)           
      
        
 
  and     
      
         
 
.                                                   
We model the game as consisting of three stages. In the first stage, the newspaper decides 
whether to supplement its print version with an online product. We designate this choice by     
and     when expanding and not expanding the product mix, respectively. In the second stage, 
each newspaper decides the political positioning of its print version,   . In the third stage, each 
newspaper chooses its subscription fees    and   , where the latter choice is relevant only if an 
online version is added in the first stage. Following the three stages, consumers decide on their  
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subscription patterns (prior to the realization of d), newspapers gain access to news and report 
them according to the locations selected in Stage 2, and readers of the online version add UGC to 
the newspapers‟ website. 11 
 
3.3 DERIVATION OF THE EQUILIBRIA 
Contingent upon the expansion decision of the two newspapers in the first stage, four 
different possibilities may arise, as follows:        ,         ,         , and          . The 
last possibility refers to the case that both newspapers offer only the print version. This case has 
already been investigated in MS (2005). The authors find that the positioning of the newspapers 
when only a print version is offered by each is     
 
 
   and    
 
 
  . Such extreme 
positioning leads to greater differentiation between the newspapers and alleviated competition on 
subscription fees. In what follows, we characterize the remaining two cases: the symmetric case 
when both newspapers choose to add an online product and the asymmetric case when only one 
newspaper adds the online version.  
 
 
                                                 
11
 Note that if the timing of the decisions is changed so that    were chosen first followed by the decision 
on whether to offer the online editions, there are circumstances under which the equilibrium that we 
derive in the next section would prevail. We provide this analysis in Appendix B. 
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3.3.1 Both Newspapers Add an Online Version 
 When both papers choose to add the online product, the segmentation of consumers is 
characterized in Figure 3. For simplicity, we will use the superscript {E,E} to characterize the 
equilibrium variables in this symmetric case. Considering the stage when consumers choose their 
subscription patterns, we start by identifying the threshold reader       
  
,  the reader who is 
indifferent between the print editions of Newspapers 1 and 2, and    
  
    
  
 , the readers who 
are indifferent between the print and online editions of Newspaper 1(2), respectively.   
 The marginal reader       
  
has the same expected utility from subscribing to the print 
editions of Newspapers 1 and 2. That is, from (3): 
 (5)        
   
  
     
  
 
  
   
     
   
   
     
   
   
   
              
From (5), the location of the subscriber indifferent between Newspapers 1 and 2 is shifted 
away from the average locations of the two newspapers,  
  
     
  
 
 , in a manner dependent on 
the discrepancies between the fees charged for the print subscriptions.  
Similarly, the location of the indifferent reader    
  
 is a function of the locations of the 
online and print editions of newspaper i and the difference between the prices of these editions: 
(6)               
  
 
   
       
  
 
 
    
     
   
   
      
      
     
   
 , i=1,2.                                      
 
Note that the right hand side of (6) is also a function of    
  
 since the location of the 
online edition     
     is a function of    
  
 from (4). Solving the system of equations (6) for 
   
  
 in terms of the locations and fees of the newspapers yields:  
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(7)            
  
 
     
           
     
 
     
      
 
  
     
 
    
     
   
     
  
     
, 
 (8)           
  
 
     
           
     
 
     
         
     
 
    
     
   
     
  
     
.                                 
In order to support the segmentation depicted in Figure 3, the solution for    
  
 should 
satisfy the inequalities         
  
       
  
     
  
   . From the expressions derived in 
(7) and (8), this may not necessarily be the case. In particular, when the print edition of the 
newspaper is significantly more expensive than the online edition (   
     
  ),    
  
 may be 
bigger and/or    
  
 may be smaller than       
  
. Hence, the print edition may not attract any 
subscribers. This result is consistent with the experience of the NYT when it started to provide 
free access to its digital content in 2007, leading to a significant decline of the circulation of the 
newspaper. Given this experience, it announced that it will start charging for access to content 
online in 2011 (Clark 2010, Economist 2010). 
It may be interesting to point out that the threshold consumers    
  
play a dual role in our 
model. The first is the traditional role that exists in any environment with market segmentation. 
Specifically, these threshold levels designate consumers who are indifferent between two 
adjacent variants of a given product. The second role is new to our model, and relates to the 
active role that online subscribers play in determining the characteristics of the online variant of 
the product. According to (2), the political position of the online edition depends upon the 
composition of subscribers to this product. As the threshold levels      
  
  increase, the segment 
of consumers who choose the online subscription has more extreme political opinions, thus 
generating more extreme content online via the UGC. As a result, the slant in reporting of the 
online variant intensifies.  
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Further, note that in traditional models of horizontal product differentiation, when 
consumers cannot affect the characteristics of the different variants the threshold consumers that 
demarcate the different segments are given by equations similar to the system (6). However, in 
contrast to our setting, product characteristics (represented by      
     for the online editions in 
our model) are considered exogenous by consumers in the traditional models. When UGC plays 
a role in affecting the slant of the online versions,     
     is no longer considered exogenous by 
the readers.  Instead, they are fully cognizant of the fact that when readers with more extreme 
political opinions subscribe to the online edition, the content of this edition becomes more 
politically biased. Readers use this information in deciding whether to choose between the print 
and online editions. Such considerations transform the system of equations (6) to the expressions 
for     
  
 in (7) and (8). 
Given the locations of the indifferent consumers expressed in (5), (7) and (8), in stage 
three newspapers choose their subscription fees    
  ,   
   to maximize their profits as 
follows:  
(9)             
   
 
   
         
  
    
               
      
  
     
      ,         
           (10)           
   
 
   
         
  
    
           
  
       
       
      .          
Optimizing (9) and (10) with respect to    
  , yields the subscription fees of the print 
editions of both newspapers as functions of the choices made in the first two stages of the game: 
(11)       
     
  
     
   
     
    
   
     
   
 
     ,                                            
              
     
  
     
   
     
     
   
     
   
 
     .  
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Optimizing (9) and (10) with respect to   
   yields: 
(12)     
      
             
    
  
    
    
  
   
  
,                                                                     
           
      
            
       
  
 
    
  
   
  
, 
where the expressions for 
    
  
   
    are derived from (7) and (8). Note that while the first term of 
the right hand side of (12) is negative, the second term is positive since 
    
  
   
     and 
    
  
   
   
 .  We will show, however, that the magnitude of the first term always dominates, thus yielding 
a lower subscription fee for the online than the print version due to the lower cost of producing 
the online variant. However, since the second term is positive, (12) implies that   
      
   
    . As a result, the profit margin of the online edition is higher than that of the print 
edition.  
We can use (7) and (8) to express the relationship between   
   and   
   in terms of 
   
  
 and the location choices of the newspapers as follows: 
(13)   
      
            
  
     
        
  
                  
  
     
   
 
,               
          
      
            
  
     
        
  
                  
  
     
   
 
.  
It may be interesting to evaluate (11) and (13) at the symmetric equilibrium, when 
   
     
       and     
  
    
  
     , because this type of equilibrium will be the 
main focus of this paper.  
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We obtain: 
(14)            
   –   
  
     
      ,                         
                  
      
  
     
        
       
                   
        
 
  . 
The second term inside the parentheses of the expression of (  
     ) measures the 
added markup that each newspaper may be able to derive due to the improved match between the 
added online variant and the preferences of online subscribers. Note that fees are higher when   
increases,   decreases, and    or  
   increase. Hence, as subscribers care more about 
confirming reports, less about accuracy, and are more heterogeneous, competition on fees is 
alleviated. This is also the case when newspapers choose more slanted reporting.  
Substituting (11) and (13) back into (9) and (10), yields the second stage payoff functions 
of the newspapers given that both chose to add the online option. Each newspaper chooses its 
location   
   to maximize this second stage payoff function. We illustrate this second stage 
optimization by considering only Newspaper 2. A similar approach is also valid for Newspaper 
1. Using the Envelope Theorem in (10) when optimizing with respect to   
  , we obtain:  
(15)      
    
  
   
   
    
  
    
  
    
  
   
   
    
  
       
  
       
  
   
   
    
  
       
  
       
  
   
  
   
  
   
   .                      
A change in   
   has a direct effect on    
   via the expressions for       
  
 and    
  
 
in (5) and (8) and an indirect effect via the effect of Newspaper 2‟s location on the print 
subscription fee of Newspaper 1,   
   (by the Envelope Theorem the effect on   
   and   
   
vanishes and   
   does not affect    
   at all). We substitute from (5), (8), (11) and (13) in the 
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derivatives on the right hand side of (15) and evaluate the resulting expression at the symmetric 
equilibrium to obtain a relationship between    
   and    
  
 as follows: 
      (16)          
     
       
 
   
         
 
        
  .                                            
It is easy to see from (16) that if segmentation arises, namely if         , then  
   
   
 
. Hence, the positioning of the print version is less extreme in comparison to the case that 
newspapers do not add an online option (the case considered in MS (2005)).  This result is not 
surprising given that each newspaper expanded its product mix to include a variant that is more 
politically extreme. It reduces, therefore, the slanting of the product that is chosen by the 
segment of the consumers who have moderate preferences.  
To investigate whether a symmetric equilibrium with segmentation by both newspapers is 
feasible, we now use (16) to derive conditions under which there exists             . We 
designate by         
     the added utility that a reader having beliefs b derives from the print 
over the online edition, given that the online segment comprises of readers in the interval 
           At the equilibrium with segmentation,    
                , namely the reader of 
type       is indifferent between the print and online editions. Moreover, for          , 
readers prefer the print version and         
       , and for            readers prefer the 
online version and         
      . We define by         
     
   
, an adjusted cost 
advantage measure of the online over the print versions of the product. In Lemma 1 we present 
conditions on   and  , which satisfy these requirements on         
    ,  and therefore support 
segmentation. 
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LEMMA 1.  
(i) To support market segmentation at the symmetric equilibrium,              and 
         , where 
      
 
 
       
 
 and       
                             
 
   
  
 
 .                    
(ii) Otherwise, when       or if       , only the print version of each newspaper can be 
supported at the equilibrium.  
(iii) If      and      , only the online version of each newspaper can be supported at the 
equilibrium.  
(iv) When segmentation can be supported, at the symmetric equilibrium:  
  
 
         . 
 
Note that the extension of each newspaper‟s product mix can be supported only if the 
extent of discretion of online readers to generate UGC is relatively moderate. Specifically, the 
relative control of online readers over the location of the online edition can be no more than 
0.376 of the control of the newspaper itself. Even with such limited discretion awarded to 
readers, segmentation may still fail unless the adjusted cost advantage of the online version, T, 
lies in the interval specified in part (i) of the Lemma. In particular, in the absence of any cost 
advantage, so that at    , each newspaper will choose not to extend its market offering at the 
symmetric equilibrium.  The adjusted cost advantage should be bigger than    , an expression 
that increases with   and   . However, the print version of each newspaper might be 
cannibalized altogether if the cost advantage is extremely big.  This happens when      , an 
expression that increases in   and   , once again. The Lemma further demonstrates that, since  
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each newspaper loses control of the characteristics of its online version due to UGC, when 
segmentation can be supported, the size of the print segment is bigger than the size of the online 
segment.   
Given the results reported in (16) and  Lemma 1, we can now compare the extent of 
slanting in reporting when newspapers extend their product mix to the extent of slanting when 
only the print version is offered by each newspaper.  
 
PROPOSITION 1. When both newspapers offer both print and online editions:  
(i)                 
      
   
 
 
   
 
, 
 (ii)      
   
 
, 
(iii)  
                         
   
  
 
   
 
. 
 
Recall that when only the print version is offered,       
   
 
. Hence, extending the 
product mix to include an online version reduces reporting slant of the print version but increases 
the slant of the online version.
12
 In essence, product diversification facilitates obtaining a better 
match between the preferences of the readers and the variants of the products they choose to 
consume. According to part (iii) of the Proposition, however, the weighted average location of 
each newspaper, with weights determined by the relative market shares of the two editions, 
declines as a result of segmentation. 
                                                 
12
  Restricting the expected slant of the print edition to the extreme location of the readers ( i.e.,  
 
   
      ) will not change the equilibrium we derive as long as     . 
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Next we investigate how UGC affects equilibrium locations and profits of the 
newspapers. Recall that    measures the extent of discretion of online readers to generate content 
online. Proposition 2 provides comparative statics with respect to  .  
 
PROPOSITION 2.  If both newspapers offer print and online subscription options:  
    
  
    
and  
   
  
  
  . 
 
To understand the role of   in explaining the comparative statics reported in Proposition 
2, recall from (2) that as   increases, the slanting in the online edition intensifies. Hence, readers 
with more extreme political opinions self select to subscribe to the online version when   
increases (      increases).  
Notice from (16) that the location     of the print edition is an increasing function of 
    . When      increases readers with more extreme political opinions generate UGC in the 
online edition. As a result, the online edition becomes more politically extreme, and so does the 
print edition, which competes against it. Since      moves in the same direction as      ,      
increases with  . The second part of the proposition states that as the discretion awarded to 
readers increases, the profits of the newspapers decrease. Bigger values of   translate to a more 
significant transfer of control from the newspaper to the readers themselves in determining the 
characteristics of the online version. Such a transfer of control leads to lower profits.  
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3.3.2 Only One Newspaper Adds an Online Version 
In this section we consider the asymmetric case when only one newspaper extends its 
product mix. Without any loss of generality, we assume that Newspaper 2 offers both versions 
and Newspaper 1 offers the print version only. We use the superscripts {NE, E} to designate this 
case. Figure 4 depicts the segmentation of the market for such an asymmetric environment. 
 
Print Subscribers                      Print Subscribers                  Online Subscribers 
 to Newspaper 1                          to Newspaper 2                   to Newspaper 2 
 
                                                       
   
                                  
   
                                                            
Figure 4: Market Segmentation when only Newspaper 2 Extends Its Product Mix. 
 
By using a similar approach as in the previous section, the relationships between the 
locations of the print versions and the threshold reader    
   
 can be derived as follows: 
(17)             
     
 
 
           
   
 
 
        
  ,    
(18)             
    
 
 
             
   
 
 
        
  .            
   
Proposition 3 follows from equations (17) and (18). 
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PROPOSITION 3.  When Newspaper 1 offers only the print edition and Newspaper 2 offers 
both the print and online editions:  
(i)     
     
 
 
       
        
 
 
    
(ii)        
    
 
 
           
   
 
 
        
    . 
 
According to part (i) of Proposition 3, since Newspaper 2 extends its product mix while 
its competitor does not, it chooses to reduce the slanting of its print version below the level 
established when both newspapers extend their lines. Such a choice facilitates Newspaper 2 to 
steal market share from Newspaper 1. As a result, Newspaper 1 is forced to shift its location 
further to the left in order to differentiate itself from the print version of Newspaper 2. Part (ii) of 
the Proposition states, indeed, that when Newspaper 1 limits its product mix in comparison to 
Newspaper 2, it loses market share, and Newspaper 2 attracts more than 50% of the readers to 
one of its two editions.  
3.3.3  Equilibrium Product line Extension Decision and the Role of UGC  
With the characterization of the symmetric and asymmetric cases complete, we can now 
investigate whether segmenting the market by both newspapers corresponds to a Nash 
Equilibrium. In Proposition 4, we prove even a stronger result, namely that extending the product 
mix for each newspaper constitutes a dominant strategy. Unfortunately, in spite of being a 
dominant strategy, the equilibrium profits of the newspapers are lower with segmentation than if 
both offer only the print versions of their papers. 
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PROPOSITION 4.  
(i) Offering both print and online versions is a dominant strategy for each newspaper. 
Specifically, for Newspaper 1   
     
    and   
      
     , and similarly for 
Newspaper 2.  
(ii) In spite of being a dominant strategy, the profit of each newspaper are lower with 
segmentation than if both offer just print editions, namely   
       
  . 
 
According to Proposition 4, competitive forces lead each newspaper to offer two different 
versions of the product. The resulting improved segmentation of consumers does not lead, 
however, to higher profits. There are two reasons why the profits of the newspapers decline with 
segmentation. First, note from (14) that equilibrium subscription fees decline when the 
newspapers reduce the slanting of their print editions. Because           , segmentation 
diminishes the extent of product differentiation between the print editions, and newspapers are 
forced to compete more aggressively for their print subscribers, thus leading to lower fees. 
Second, given that online subscribers are active in determining the extent of slant in the online 
editions, the ability of the newspapers to extract rents from consumers diminishes, as each 
newspaper loses some control over the attributes of its extended product line. In spite of the 
reduced profitability, though, each newspaper is forced to offer the online edition in order to 
prevent the rival from gaining market share.  
The analysis so far has assumed that    is exogenous. In order to further explore the role 
of UGC we now extend our analysis to allow     to become a decision variable chosen 
simultaneously with the decision on whether to extend the product mix in Stage 1. 
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COROLLARY 1: If            are chosen in the first stage together with the extension 
decision of the newspapers, each newspaper chooses a positive      The outcome         
cannot correspond to an equilibrium even though the profits of each newspaper decline with the 
parameter  . 
Recall that according to Proposition 2, equilibrium profits in our model decline with  . 
However, as Corollary 1 shows this does not mean that each newspaper chooses      when it 
has the flexibility to vary   . When the competitor of Newspaper i chooses     , Newspaper 
j‟s two editions are undifferentiated. Newspaper i can then choose      in response, and steal 
market share from j by introducing two different variants of its product.  
Next we consider an environment where each newspaper offers both editions but has full 
control over the positioning of the online edition. Essentially, the newspapers do not permit 
readers to add UGC online. Instead, newspaper i has the exclusive rights to choose both    and 
  
 . In Proposition 5 we report that in such an environment, each newspaper eliminates any 
product differentiation between its print and online editions, thus preventing further 
segmentation of its readers according to the intensity of their political opinions. 
 
PROPOSITION 5: When newspapers have the exclusive rights to choose the positioning of 
both the print and online editions, at the equilibrium each newspaper does not introduce any 
differentiation in the location of the two editions (i.e.,       
  .  
 
In view of the result reported in Proposition 5 it is now easier to explain part (ii) of 
Proposition 4. Specifically, even though at the equilibrium both newspapers choose to extend 
their product lines by introducing online editions, their profits actually decline in comparison to 
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an environment where both offer only print editions. As readers become involved in generating 
UGC on the online versions, each newspaper is forced to de-facto offer two differently slanted 
versions of its product. According to Proposition 5, the newspapers would not choose to offer 
such differentiation if they could fully control the characteristics of both editions. 
Notice that while according to Corollary 1 each newspaper chooses to differentiate its 
products with UGC (     and therefore   
     ), according to Proposition 5 it is never 
optimal for a paper to differentiate its products in an environment where readers are not 
permitted to add UGC to the online editions (  
    ). The difference in these results is due to 
two opposing effects that extra segmentation introduces. The positive effect is the ability of the 
newspaper to steal market share from its rival by introducing a differentiated product. The 
negative effect is the intensified price competition that is implied by excessive segmentation. 
While in an environment with UGC the market share effect is dominant, in an environment 
without UGC the market share effect is weaker and the competitive effect dominates.  
It is noteworthy that with UGC each newspaper is more limited in its ability to 
differentiate the online variant than when it has full control over the content of this edition. 
Hence, introducing the differentiated variant with UGC is an indirect commitment of the 
newspaper to keep the slanting of its online edition and therefore the competing print edition 
relatively moderate, thus squeezing the size of the audience that remains for the competing 
newspaper. In other words, in comparison to an environment in which the newspapers have full 
control over both editions the temptation to steal market share from the competitor is relatively 
strong in an environment with UGC, and thus      in equilibrium.  
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3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Over the past decade news media have been increasingly publishing opinions and news 
stories of their readers. This is facilitated by online editions which provide technical capabilities 
for readers to add their own content to the publications. We show that extending the product line 
to include online editions reduces the extent of slanting in reporting of the print edition but 
increases the extent of slant in the online edition. The increased slant of the online edition is 
primarily generated by the readers themselves who choose to add content to this variant of the 
product. In fact, we demonstrate that if newspapers had full control over the content of the online 
editions, they would choose the slant of their print and online editions to be identical. In contrast, 
when UGC is added by readers to the online editions, each newspaper is indirectly forced by 
subscribers to offer two differentiated versions of its product. We also find that as the extent of 
discretion of users to generate content online increases, newspapers become more polarized, yet 
their profits decline. The additional discretion awarded to users implies that the newspapers lose 
control over the attributes of their product lines, thus limiting their ability to extract rents from 
consumers. Hence, in spite of increased differentiation the profitability of the newspapers 
declines.  
 Note that our model assumes full coverage of the market of readers. If the market is less 
than fully covered when only print editions are offered, introducing online editions that are more 
politically biased due to UGC might lead to greater coverage. We demonstrate in the Appendix 
that this can enhance each newspaper‟s profits. In addition, given our goal of investigating the 
role of UGC in affecting political bias in news reporting, our model focuses on the political 
opinions of readers as the sole determinant of their choice between the print and online editions. 
There are obviously many other attributes that distinguish consumers who prefer one edition 
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over the other. Online users are likely to be younger or have higher valuation for the 
technological features provided by online newspapers (such as content sharing-digging, mobile 
applications, and so on). In the Appendix, we incorporate a second dimension of heterogeneity, 
unrelated to politics that differentiates among readers. In this case we show that there is reduced 
tendency on the part of newspapers to rely on political beliefs when segmenting the market. As a 
result, the polarization of the newspapers moves closer to the outcome in an environment when 
only print editions are offered. 
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS  
PROOFS FOR “THE IMPACT OF ADVERTISING ON MEDIA BIAS” 
 
Derivations of Equations 16-17 and Proof of Lemma 1 
(i) Single-Homing: Second stage prices are obtained by optimizing (12) with respect to    and    
as follows:                                                                                                     
(A.1)  
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(A.2)             
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(A.3)             
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(A.4)             
   
   
 
 
   
  
       
   
                 .     
From (9): 
(A.5)   
       
       
  
       
   
        
  
       
     
   
        
  
 .  
(A.6)                 
       
   
  
   
 
          
        
  
 , and                                            
(A.7)   
       
   
 
   
 
          
        
  
 .       
From (2): 
 (A.8)  
       
   
 
   
           
 and  
       
   
 
   
           
.     
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Substituting (2), (9), (A.5), (A.6) and (A.7), into the first order conditions (A.1)-(A.4), 
evaluating them at symmetry (         ), and solving for    and   , we get   
  
 
and   
  
 
 as 
given in (14). And substituting (A.6), (A.7) and (9) into (A.3) and (A.4) and solving for    and 
   , one can get equilibrium advertising fees as a function of the locations: 
 (A.9)    
    
     
        
  
   
  
        
   
  ,    
    
     
        
  
   
  
        
   
  
To obtain the equilibrium locations chosen by the newspapers in the first stage, one has to 
solve first for the second stage fees,           and           as functions of arbitrary location 
choices (not only symmetric). Substituting the equilibrium strategies back into (12), we obtain 
the first stage payoff functions designated as           . Differentiating with respect to the 
locations yields from the Envelope Theorem that:  
(A.10)     
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
                   .  
To illustrate the derivation of the first stage equilibrium, we focus on the optimization of 
Newspaper 1. For this newspaper, the terms of (A.10) can be derived as follows:  
(A.11)  
   
   
 = 
  
   
 
       
   
     
 
   
 
       
   
   ,       
(A.12)  
   
   
   
   
 
  
   
 
       
   
   
   
    
 
   
 
       
       
       
   
   
   
    and   
(A.13)  
   
   
   
   
 
 
   
 
       
   
   
   
   .        
While the expression for 
   
   
  in (A.13) can be directly derived from (A.9), to obtain the 
expression from 
   
   
 in (A.12), we need to utilize the Implicit Function Approach by totally 
differentiating the first order conditions (A.1) and (A.2) that determine subscription fees 
(
   
   
   and 
   
   
 = 0). We obtain: 
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(A.14)                 
    
   
       
    
      
      
    
      
      
    
      
    and 
  
(A.15)     
    
      
      
    
   
       
    
      
      
    
      
   .    
From (A.14) and (A.15): 
(A.16)   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
    
    
   
 
    
      
    
      
    
   
 
 
  
 
    
      
    
      
    
      
    
      
  .   
  
Using (A.1) and (A.2) in evaluating (A.16) at the symmetric equilibrium yields: 
(A.17)  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
   
    
     
   
    
     
   
    
      
   
    
     
 
  
 
        
            
  ;   
where   
         
 
          
 ,     
         
 
          
  and  
    
   
     
   
 
 
   
  
       
     
.  
For second order condition, the determinant of the inverted matrix on the RHS of (A.17) 
should be positive implying that Z< 1.5. From (A.17), therefore:  
(A.18)  
   
   
 
   
   
 
    
   
   
 
    
 .      
We can now complete the characterization of the optimal location choice of Newspaper 
1. Using (A.11) - (A.13), as well as the derivation for 
   
   
 from (A.9) and 
   
   
 from (A.18) in 
(A.10), we obtain at the symmetric equilibrium:  
(A.19)  
   
   
 
  
    
  
   
  
 
   
   
 
 
   
  
    
  
  , where 
   
   
 is given by (A.18).   
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At the symmetric equilibrium when         , we obtain from (A.19) a quadratic 
equation as follows: 
(A.20)                     
   
 
    
  
   
 
 
 
 
  
  
    
  
 
   
   
    
   
    .  
The two roots of this quadratic equation are:  
  
   
   
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
   
     ; where    
   
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
   
  
 
 
    
 
   
   
    
   
  . 
Only the bigger root guarantees stability of reaction functions (i.e. 
    
   
  < 0.) As a result, 
the optimal location at the Single-Homing equilibrium is given in (16). Note that if     the 
quadratic expression (A.20) is positive for all values of  . Hence, 
   
   
   for all B and the 
optimal location is the corner solution      . Hence,       if:  
(A.21)      
   
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
   
  
 
 
    
 
   
   
    
   
    .    
Inequality (A.21) holds if:  
(A.22)    
   
   
           
 .          
We next investigate the conditions under which      is positive. From (14):  
(A.23)                  
      
   
 
    
  
 = 
   
   
          .                                                                                                           
       implies    
     
  
 or equivalently from (16): 
(A.24)      
   
 
   
  
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
    
 
   
   
    
   
  
                           
   
  
     
  
 
   
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
            
   
. 
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Given that the LHS is positive, there are two cases where this inequality can hold: when 
RHS is negative (Case 1) and when both sides are positive but the LHS is bigger (Case 2). Case 
1 implies that   
   
   
            
. For Case 2, squaring both sides of (A.24) and solving for T 
yields   
   
          
            
. Combining the two cases, yields that       if:  
(A.25)               
   
          
            
. 
Combining (A.25) and (A.22) yields the condition of part (i) of Lemma 1.  
(ii) Double-Homing: Using a very similar approach to that developed when advertisers 
Single-Home, we obtain the following first order condition for the choice of location in the first 
stage.  
(A.26)      
   
   
   
   
       
       
   
 
   
   
  
    
   
       
   
  
    
       
       
   
 
    
   
       
   
 
   
   
  , 
where the expression for   , which follows from the maximization of (11) is:  
(A.27)       
  
            
   
    
             
   
 ,    
                  
  
            
   
    
             
   
 . 
 At the symmetric equilibrium (A.26) reduces to: 
(A.28)  
   
   
 
    
   
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
   
   
   .                 
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To derive the expression for  
   
   
, we have to use, once again, the Implicit Function 
Approach, by totally differentiating the first order condition for the subscription fees   . Those 
conditions are: 
 (A.29)              
   
   
               
     
          
         
  
  
               ,  
                         
   
   
               
     
          
        
  
  
               .  
Total differentiation of the first order conditions yields the following system of equations 
for 
   
   
 and 
   
   
: 
     
    
 
          
  
 
   
  
 
        
  
   
   
   
   
   
    
  
 
  
 
  
    
  
 
  
 
  
  where   
     
   
 and for 
second order conditions   
 
 
   or   
 
 
   
  
. Solving for 
   
   
,  we obtain:
   
   
 
   
     
     
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
  
]. Substituting back into (A.28), yields a quadratic equation in B as follows: 
(A.30)                   
   
  
 
 
 
          .                                                                               
There are two roots to this equation. However, only one satisfies also the condition for 
stability of reaction function. It is given in equation (17). The discriminant of the solution in (17) 
is positive if   
  
 
   
. As well, to guarantee that      , it follows from (15) that   
    
   
. 
Using the expression for B from (17) in the last inequality, yields   
           
 
           
. This is a 
more demanding constraint than the one necessary to insure that the discriminant is positive, thus 
yielding part (ii) of Lemma 1.  
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Proof of Proposition 1 
First note from (16) and (17) that   
     
   
 
 
   when    . Differentiating the 
expressions of     
   and   
   with respect to    for the range of parameters that support each 
type of equilibrium yields  
   
  
  
   and 
   
  
  
  . Hence,   
       and    
      .  
 
 
Regions of the Parameter    that Support Single and Double-Homing 
(i) Single-Homing: To ensure that Single-Homing is an equilibrium, we use   
   from 
(14) in (8) and evaluate (8) at the symmetric equilibrium (i.e.,           to obtain     
         and             . To guarantee that the interior interval in Figure 1 disappears, 
we impose the restriction that        , which happens when      .  
(ii) Partial Double-Homing:  In Partial Double-Homing equilibrium, in which some 
advertisers Double-Home and some Single-Home (i.e.,                ), the newspapers 
choose subscription and advertising fees in the second stage to maximize the objectives: 
         
     
   
     
         
   
   ,           
     
   
     
         
   
   .   
When the newspapers locate symmetrically so that         , the solution to this 
maximization can be obtained as:   
  
 
 
      
   
 
    
  
 
 
   
    
  
 
  and    
  
 
 
 
 
    
  
 
 .  
Using   
   in (8) and evaluating it at the symmetry (i.e.,            we obtain     
  
 
    and 
       
  
 
. Hence,         if        , and        if    
 
 
  . 
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(iii) Double-Homing: All advertisers will Double-Home when       . It follows from 
part (ii) that this happens if    
 
 
  .  
From (i), (ii) and (iii) we conclude that while for        Single-Homing is the unique 
equilibrium, for    
 
 
   Double-Homing is the unique equilibrium. It also follows from the 
above that between    and     Single-Homing and Partial Double-Homing equilibria may co-
exist. 
 
Optimality of Linear Decision Rules 
We show the optimality of linear slanting strategies when the newspapers‟ sole source of 
revenue is subscription fees.  To this end we first derive the first order conditions that follow 
from the newspapers‟ first stage location choices without restricting the functional form of the 
slanting strategies               . Then we show that a linear slanting rule satisfies these first 
order conditions.  
The consumer who is indifferent between the two newspapers satisfies the equation 
   
     
  where   
  is given by (1).  Solving this equation and using the distributional 
properties of the random variable   (        
  ) and the uniform distribution of the parameter 
 , yields: 
(A.31)            
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In the second stage, newspapers set their prices    and    to maximize (3). First order 
conditions for this maximization are: 
(A.32)  
  
   
              
  
           
   ,  
(A.33)  
  
   
              
  
           
   . 
At the symmetric equilibrium (i.e.,                  ) the solution to (A.32) and 
(A.33) is: 
(A.34)                     
               . 
To obtain the equilibrium locations chosen by the newspapers in the first stage, one has to 
solve first for the second stage fees,           as functions of arbitrary location choices (not only 
symmetric). Substituting the equilibrium strategies back into (3), we obtain the first stage payoff 
functions          . Differentiating with respect to the locations yields from the Envelope 
Theorem that:  
 (A.35)    
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
                   . 
It follows from (A.35) and (3) that, 
(A.36)  
       
   
 
       
   
   
   
   , 
(A.37)    
       
   
 
       
   
   
   
   . 
From (A.31): 
(A.38)  
       
   
 
  
           
 , 
(A.39)  
       
   
  
               
            
 
     
  
                                 
     
  
          
 
                                            
                                      
          
, where   
      
        
   
. 
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To obtain 
   
   
, we utilize, once again, the Implicit Function approach by totally 
differentiating the first order conditions (A.32) and (A.33), and solving the resulting system of 
equations using     from (A.34). This procedure yields  
(A.40)  
   
   
 
           
 
       
   
             . 
Suppose the firms use a  linear decision rule:  
(A.41)                    , then: 
(A.42)            , 
(A.43)                                , 
(A.44)     
     
    
    
    
  . 
 
Substituting (A.42)-(A.44) into (A.38)-(A.40), and using these in (A.37) at the symmetric 
equilibrium yields: 
(A.45)   
     
  
   
  
  
  . 
From (A.45): 
(A.46)    
 
 
  
 
       
. 
 
Thus, the linear slanting rule (A.41) allows us to solve the first order condition in (A.37) 
and find an optimal location as given in (A.46). Since the newspapers are symmetric, the same 
rule also satisfies the first order condition for Newspaper 1(i.e., (A.36)) as well. 
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We will now show that this rule can be expressed as       
 
     
       for 
newspaper i. We will assume that Newspaper 1 follows such a decision rule and demonstrate that 
the best response of Newspaper 2 is to follow such a rule, as well. Specifically, assuming that 
       
 
     
       we designate the linear rule followed by Newspaper 2 as         
   , where      .  
Given the assumed behavior of Newspaper 1, a consumer who chooses to subscribe to it 
derives the expected payoff:     
    
  
   
      
  
  
   
      
     . Her payoff 
when choosing Newspaper 2 is: 
    
               
   
          
                .  
To find the consumer who is indifferent between the two newspapers we solve the 
equation    
     
  for b as follows:  
(A.47)                   
          
  
   
  
          
     
 
   
 
 
       
      
 
   
   
 . 
Assuming without loss of generality that   
 
   
  , in the second stage the newspapers 
choose their subscription fees to maximize:    
           
   
   and    
           
   
  . Note that 
  
 
   
   simply guarantees that Newspaper 2 serves the upper end of subscribers above 
       and Newspaper 1 serves the lower end. Once the coefficients are derived this assumption 
is indeed satisfied as      . Optimizing with respect to    and   , yields the second stage 
prices as a function of   ,  and    as follows: 
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(A.48)                 
 
   
       
           
  
   
  
          
     
 
   
 
 
 
 
,  
                            
 
   
        
           
  
   
  
          
     
 
   
 
 
 
 
. 
It follows, therefore, that: 
                    
   
  
      
       
 
,       
   
   
 
        
      
 
   
 
 
. 
When Newspaper 2 chooses its slanting strategy rule in stage 1, namely   and   , it 
optimizes its payoff function   , given the prices established subsequently in the second stage. 
Substituting for                and              back into the payoff functions, yields the first 
stage payoff function for Newspaper 2,              . Using the Envelope Theorem: 
(A.49)             
   
  
  
  
   
 
       
  
 
       
   
   
  
   
  
   
      
 
 
     
 
          
    
 
   
   
, 
                        
   
   
  
  
   
 
       
   
 
       
   
   
   
   
  
   
        
      
 
   
  
     
 
   
   
. 
From the second equation of (A.49), it follows that  
   
   
   when     
 
   
. Hence, 
the decision rule of Newspaper 2                    can be written as 
      
 
     
       where    has been normalized to 
 
     
. To find the value of   , 
we further restrict our attention to symmetric Bayesian equilibria, which implies that         . 
Substituting into the first equation of (A.49), implies that  
   
 
 
   
, thus,    
   
 
, and by 
the symmetry assumption,     
   
 
.  
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Incomplete Coverage of the Subscribers Market 
Single-Homing: 
In this section, we demonstrate that when advertisers Single-Home and when the 
subscriber market is not covered as in Figure 5 there exist conditions under which    
 
 
   
 
      Buy Newspaper 1                     Do not Buy                     Buy Newspaper 2 
  
 
                                                                                 
  
Figure 5: Segmentation of the Subscriber Market 
 
The reader who is indifferent between buying Newspaper 1 and not buying at all satisfies 
the equation:  
(A.50)     
    where  
   
        
      
   
      
  
   
   
 
  
   
   
  from (1). 
 
The above equation has two roots: 
(A.51)     
   
   
  
    
 
      
 
 
 
      
  
   
   
 
  
   
   
 . 
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Notice that for the segmentation given in Figure A1 to hold we need 
    
 
  
      
      
   
   at      which implies: 
(A.52)     
   
     
.  
Further at    , we should have    
     and at      ,    
   , thus : 
(A.53)             
  
   
   
 
  
   
   
  , and       
  
   
   
 
  
   
   
    
  
    
   
   
  . 
The root in (A.51) that satisfies (A.52) is: 
(A.54)      
   
   
  
    
 
      
 
 
 
      
  
   
   
 
  
   
   
  
         
   
   
  
    
 
 
 
   
   
  
  
  
   
 . 
Similarly, the location of the reader who is indifferent between buying Newspaper 2 and 
not buying at all can be calculated as: 
(A.55)     
   
   
  
    
 
 
 
   
   
  
  
  
   
 , 
and         if 
(A.56)              
  
   
   
 
  
   
   
  , and      
  
   
   
 
  
   
   
    
  
    
   
   
  . 
 When an advertiser of appeal parameter   chooses to advertise in Newspaper 1, its 
expected payoff is given as: 
(A.57)                    
 
   
    
  
  
 
  
   
     .     
If it chooses to advertise in Newspaper 2 its expected payoff is: 
(A.58)          
 
   
    
  
  
 
  
  
     .  
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The advertiser who is indifferent between Newspaper 1 and 2 can be derived from (A.57) 
and (A.58) by solving for   in            : 
(A.59)         
            
    
    
    
  
 
          
 
     
    
    
  
. 
In the last stage the newspapers set their subscription and advertising fees to maximize 
their profits: 
(A.60)      
         
   
     
     
   
   ,          
         
   
     
     
   
  , 
which yields the following first order conditions: 
(A.61)  
 
   
             
   
   
     
    
    
  
     
(A.62)  
 
   
             
   
   
     
    
    
  
     
(A.63)     
     
   
 
  
        
   
     
 
  
            
    
    
        
        
    
    
  
 
    
   
     
 
  , 
(A.64)     
     
   
 
  
     
   
     
    
  
            
    
    
        
        
    
    
  
 
 
   
     
    
  . 
Simultaneously solving (A.61) and (A.62) we get: 
(A.65)       
      
    
    
  
   
  
 
 
  
  
        , 
(A.66)       
      
    
    
  
   
  
 
 
  
  
        . 
Thus, at the symmetric equilibrium (i.e.,       ): 
(A.67)     
    
    
    
   
 .  
Using (A.67) in (A.64) at the symmetric equilibrium yields: 
(A.68)        
   
     
            
    
   
. 
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To obtain the equilibrium locations with incomplete coverage we differentiate the first 
stage payoff functions          with respect to the locations and use the Envelope Theorem:   
(A.69)   
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
   .                . 
For Newspaper 2, it follows from (A.69) that, 
(A.70)  
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
     
Using the Implicit Function approach by totally differentiating the first order conditions 
(A.63) and (A.64) and solving the resulting system of equations using    from (A.67)  and    
from (A.68) at the symmetric equilibrium we obtain: 
(A.71)   
   
   
   
   
   
  where 
  
     
       
    
   
  
  
   
    
  
    
  
  
   
           
     
  
  
   
    
  
      
      
    
     
  
  
   
    
  . 
From (12), (A.59), and (A.71), at the symmetric equilibrium (A.70) becomes: 
(A.72)  
   
   
  
   
   
  
    
   
 
    
   
  
   
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
     
  
  
   
    
   
From (A.55),  
   
   
  . Notice that the first term inside the brackets in (A.72) is always 
positive and the second term is positive if 
   
   
   and if    
    
   
. From (A.65) 
   
   
   if 
   
    
   
. Therefore, if    
    
   
,  
   
   
  , and the newspaper will continue to reduce bias. 
Since 
   
   
   it follows that bias will be reduced until    
    
   
. Because at the Single-Homing 
equilibrium with complete coverage        it follows that    
  
 
  Hence, incomplete  
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coverage of the type depicted in Figure 5, will never lead to an equilibrium where each 
newspaper covers less than  half of the segment of readers who prefer its location best (for 1 this 
segment is    , and for 2 this segment is    ). 
 We now derive the conditions on the parameters of the model to guarantee that less than 
full coverage moderates the extent of bias at the equilibrium in comparison to     
 
 
  . To 
obtain the conditions we substitute the equilibrium price from (A.68) back into (A.55) and solve 
for    in terms of    as follows: 
(A.73)                  
   
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
    
    
          
           . 
It is very easy to show that 
   
   
 in the above expression is positive when    
  
 
. 
Evaluating the right-hand side of (A.73) at    
  
 
 yields therefore, that: 
(A.74)      
   
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
    
    
 
  
 
 
 . 
The right-hand side of (A.74) is smaller than 
 
 
   if: 
(A.75)      
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
    
    
 
  
 
 
    
   
. 
Hence, as long as   is sufficiently small (e.g., when the reservation price of readers   is 
low and their valuation of accurate reporting   is high), incomplete coverage may yield 
moderation of bias below    .  Note that condition (A.75) does not necessarily contradict (A.53) 
and (A.56), conditions necessary to support the type of incomplete coverage we consider.  
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Double-Homing: 
Suppose that the newspapers, this time, cover only the middle of the market (i.e, between 
   and    in Figure 6) and advertisers Double-Home. 
 
       Do not Buy          Buy Newspaper 1        Buy Newspaper 2           Do not Buy  
  
 
                                                                                                                             
                         
Figure 6: Segmentation of the Subscriber Market 
 
We demonstrate that at the limit as        and      , the newspapers may have 
incentives to moderate their bias in reporting in comparison to the full market coverage case that 
is analyzed in Section 2.4.  
Again, the reader who is indifferent between buying Newspaper 1 and not buying at all 
satisfies equation (A.50). For the segmentation given in Figure 6 to hold we need: 
    
 
  
      
      
   
   at      which implies: 
(A.76)     
   
     
.  
Further at    , we should have    
     and at      ,    
    . The root in 
(A.51) that satisfies (A.76) is: 
(A.77)
    
   
   
  
    
 
      
 
 
 
      
  
   
   
 
  
   
   
  
   
   
  
    
 
 
 
   
   
  
  
  
   
 . 
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Similarly, the location of the reader who is indifferent between buying Newspaper 2 and 
not buying at all can be calculated as: 
(A.78)     
   
   
  
    
 
 
 
   
   
  
  
  
   
 . 
One can show that in this case as well, the newspapers will choose to cover at least one 
half of the readers who prefer their locations best, namely    
  
 
 and     
  
 
. Note from 
(A.78) that:  
(A.79)  
   
   
 
       
 
   
   
   
   
 
           
            
  
Equation (A.79) implies that newspapers may have incentives to moderate their bias, 
once again. The benefit to advertisers in this case can be derived as:         
 
   
    
      
  
  
  
      , and         
 
   
    
  
  
 
  
      
     .  
When advertisers Double-Home, advertising fees are determined by the requirement that  
         and          , thus yielding: 
(A.80)       
             
   
 
         
    
 
   
  , 
(A.81)       
             
   
 
     
        
 
   
  . 
Newspapers‟ profits when they cover only the middle of the market (and when 
advertisers Double-Home) are: 
 (A.82)           
         
   
   ,               
         
   
  . 
where    , and     are as given in (A.80) and (A.81).   
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Let   
    and   
        denote Newspaper 2‟s profits when it covers and does not cover 
the market as given in (13) and (A.82), respectively. Then, when        and      : 
(A.83)  
   
       
   
 
   
   
   
 
 
   
                
   
   
. 
Recall that at the Double-Homing equilibrium      . Hence, the sign of the above  
difference depends only on the sign of 
   
   
. From (A.79), 
   
   
   if      . This inequality is 
more likely when the variable  , defined in (A.75), is relatively small (e.g., when the reservation 
price of readers   is low and their valuation of accurate reporting   is high). If the sign of (A.83) 
is negative, newspapers have incentives to moderate when         and      . Note that 
even when 
   
   
  , in which case the newspapers have incentives to polarize, bias will at most 
be equal to   , because, 
   
   
   when       and      . 
 
Asymmetric Accuracy 
We investigate the impact of asymmetry in newspapers‟ data accuracy on reporting bias 
when the papers‟ sole source of revenue is subscription fees. Specifically, we assume that 
Newspaper 1 has access to more accurate data than Newspaper 2:      
     
 .  In this case 
location of reader who is indifferent between the two newspapers is: 
(A.84)          = 
     
   
 
       
       
 + 
     
 
 
 
  
 
    
     
  
       
.  
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For the newspapers‟ second stage pricing decisions, we optimize (3) with respect to    
and     which yields the following first order conditions: 
(A.85)  
  
   
             
     
   
 
  
       
   ,  
(A.86)  
  
   
             
     
   
 
  
       
   . 
Substituting (A.84) in (A.85) and (A.86) and simultaneously solving for    and    we get 
equilibrium subscription fees as functions of the newspapers locations: 
(A.87)     
        
     
  
      
 
         
     
     
     
 
 , 
(A.88)      
         
     
  
      
 
         
     
     
     
 
 . 
Substituting these second stage equilibrium strategies            into (3) we obtain the 
first stage payoff functions          . Differentiating with respect to the locations yields from 
the Envelope Theorem:  
(A.89)    
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
                   . 
It follows from (A.89) that, 
(A.90)  
       
   
 
       
   
   
   
   , 
(A.91)    
       
   
 
       
   
   
   
   . 
Using (A.87), (A.88) and (A.84) to find the terms of (A.90) and (A.91) and solving them 
simultaneously for the newspapers‟ first stage location choices yields: 
(A.92)      
 
 
   
     
     
  
    
, 
(A.93)                 
 
 
   
     
     
  
    
. 
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The equilibrium locations derived illustrate that Newspaper 1, which has access to more 
accurate data, introduces less bias in reporting and the opposite is true about Newspaper 2, which 
has less precise data available. Hence, the utility formulation introduces some tradeoff between 
vertical differentiation (in our case precision of data) and horizontal differentiation (in our case 
bias in reporting). There may be different reasons why a newspaper has access to more accurate 
data, including lower cost of conducting investigations due to greater experience in investigative 
reporting. Hence, if    
  can be chosen endogenously, the newspaper facing lower cost will 
likely choose greater accuracy in gathering information.  
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PROOFS FOR “USER-GENERATED CONTENT AND BIAS IN NEWS MEDIA”  
 
 
 
 
Proof of Lemma 1:  
In order to support segmentation the expression inside the radicals in (7) and (8) (the 
discriminants of the quadratic equations) have to be positive. From (8) for 
     
          
         
     
   
 
     
  
  , we need,therefore: 
 (B.1)         
  
     
            . 
Using (16) in (B.1), the last inequality is satisfied when  
                    
  
      
  
 
                    
  
  . Notice that 
                    
  
     and  
                    
  
      for      . Thus, 
                    
  
      
  
   . The restrictions for Newspaper 1 are similarly found. 
Thus, 
                    
  
     
                    . 
 
We define          as the function obtained by multiplying     
                by  
     
   
, 
then:          
     
   
    
               = 
 
 
                            
     
   
        . Note that for        ,      is a concave function of      , implying that it can 
change sign from positive to negative at most once. To guarantee that a root to the equation 
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           exists, we investigate whether H( ) changes its sign from positive to negative over 
the interval               . Specifically, whether            and           . Evaluating the 
function      at       and       yields: 
(B.2)                
                             
 
   
  
   ,   and           
(B.3)               
 
 
       
    .                                                                                                 
Requiring that             and             yields:    
 
 
       
    
 
                             
 
   
  
     .          if and only if       
       . 
Note that the function      is concave because  
         
       
  
 
 
 
   
  
              
  when       and         . It obtains its maximum value in the range [0,   ] at   
   
    
 
                     
  
  . It is easy to show that   
    
  
 
             . Because 
            from Lemma 1, it follows that                 as well. The threshold reader 
who is indifferent between the print and the online editions satisfies the equation           . 
It follows, therefore, that the root of the last equation is bigger than 
  
 
.  
 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
From (9) and (10) optimizing with respect to the subscription prices   
     
      
    
and   
   yields the following first order conditions: 
(B.4)  
    
  
   
   
 
   
  
    
  
   
        
             
              
  
    ,                    
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(B.5) 
    
  
    
   
 
   
 
 
    
  
   
        
             
        
       
  
   
      
     
        
      
  
 
   ,           
(B.6)  
    
  
   
   
 
   
   
    
  
   
        
           
              
  
    ,                 
(B.7)  
    
  
    
   
 
   
 
  
    
  
    
        
           
        
       
  
    
      
      
    
  
       
   
  
 .    
According to (7) 
    
  
   
     
    
  
    
  . Using this relation and summing (B.4) and (B.5), we 
get: 
(B.8)       
      
          
   
       
  
   
  
 .                 
Substituting (5) into (B.8) we obtain: 
 (B.9)      
   
 
 
 
  
   
   
     
       
  
     
  
 
   
  
  
 
.                                               
Using a similar approach, the subscription fee for the print edition of Newspaper 2 can be 
derived as: 
(B.10)       
   
 
 
 
  
   
   
     
       
  
     
  
 
   
  
  
 
.                                                    
Solving (B9) and (B10) for    
   and    
   we get the expressions in (11). Rewriting (B.4) as  
   
             
       
    
  
    
    
  
   
  
, and substituting 
    
  
   
   
     
  
 
 
 
 
         
          
  
      
 from (7), we obtain: 
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(B.11)        
             
       
  
     
     
  
                
  
          
   
 
 .             
Using a similar approach for Newspaper 2 we find:  
(B.12)        
             
      
  
     
        
  
             
  
         
   
 
.                        
 
Substituting the equilibrium strategies back into the profit functions (9) and (10), we 
obtain the second stage profit function   
     
     
   . From the Envelope Theorem: 
(B.13)       
   
  
   
   
   
  
   
   
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
     ,          
(B.14)        
   
  
   
   
   
  
   
   
   
  
   
   
   
  
   
      .                 
To illustrate the derivation of the equilibrium location choices, we focus on the 
optimization of Newspaper 2. From (10): 
   
  
   
   
 
   
 
(B.15)  
   
    
  
   
      
            
        
       
  
   
   
       
  
    
  
    
  
   
       
              
Using 
       
  
   
   
 
 
 
   
     
   
    
     
   
 , 
    
  
   
   
 
     
   
    
      
            
  
         
   
 , 
and 
    
  
   
   
   
     
 
  
  
 
     from (5), (8), and (11) in (B.15) yields: 
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(B.16)  
  
        
         
  
         
  
   
   
      
       
 
  
   
     
   
 
 
       
13
            
At the symmetric equilibrium,    
     
  , therefore, we can replace    
   with 
  
   in (B.16) and solve for    
  : 
(B.17)    
      
   
 
   
        
       
  
 
 
  = 
 
 
   
  
   
   
      
  
 
 
 .                
Notice that    
  
    implies   
     
             
 
 
   . Further, 
            
      
   
 
 
        
 
 
        
 
   
  
      
   
 
  
 
        
 
 
    
  
 
    
 
 
        
  
       
   
 
, since      
  
 
. Finally, 
                         
   
  
     
        
   
  
  
        
   
 
    
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
          
 
         
   
 
  since        
  . 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Note that in a similar fashion the first order condition with respect to   
   can be derived as: 
 
   
  
   
     
  
        
         
  
         
  
   
   
     
      
 
  
   
     
   
 
      . 
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Proof of Proposition 2:   
First observe from (16) that 
     
     
 
      
   
  . From the proof of Lemma 1 we know  
       
     
   when           , given that      changes its sign from positive to negative at this 
point.  Using the Implicit Function Theorem we can write: 
     
  
  
        
  
        
     
       or  .  It is immediate from the expression derived for      that 
   
     
   
      
        
   
        
            
 
             
         
  
   
      
   . Thus, using 
(16)  
    
   
 
      
 
 
 
   
         
         
 
  
      
   
     
   
  
      
 
 
  
 
      
 
  
  
      
   
     
   
  >0. 
Again from (16),  
    
  
 
 
   
       
     
  
       
 
   
   , which implies:
    
  
 
 
   
  
       
        
  
   
 
         
     
        
 
   
   . Substituting for 
         
     
 and 
        
  
  into this 
expression, we obtain: 
(B.18)  
     
  
  
 
   
 
        
 
         
 
            
              
    
           
 
       
    
        
 
                      
 
 .      
Notice that the denominator in (B.18) is negative since 
         
     
  . In the numerator, 
                      since   
    
  
 
. Thus, 
    
  
  . As well,      
     
  
  
    
         
  
    in the region        
  
 
   ). 
  86 
Finally,   
    
  
  
  
 
   
  
    
  
  
    
           
          since  
    
  
  
   
and    
           
       
  
     
        
  
             
  
         
   
 
    given that 
   
  
 
  
 
 . 
 
Proof of Proposition 3:  
Using a similar approach, as in section 3.3.1 of the study, the expressions for the 
threshold consumers       
   
 and    
   
 as functions of the decisions made by the newspapers 
in the three stages of the game are: 
(B.19)            
    
=  
   
      
    
 
 
    
       
    
   
      
    
   
   
 ,                                                                     
              
   
 
   
           
     
 
     
          
     
 
   
      
    
     
  
     
 .                                      
 The payoff functions of the newspapers are: 
(B.21)                
    
       
       
   
   
      ,                                                                                      
(B.22)        
    
       
   
 
   
   
        
    
   
       
    
   
   
      .                                 
From (B.21) and (B.22) optimizing with respect to    
           and  
   , yields 
expressions similar to those derived when both newspapers extend their product lines. 
Specifically, similar expressions to (11) and (B.12), as follows: 
       (B.23)     
      
  
     
   
      
     
   
      
    
 
     ,                                                   
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(B.24)     
      
  
     
   
      
      
   
      
    
 
     , and                                      
(B.25)       
           
       
  
     
        
   
             
   
         
    
 
.                                  
Substituting the equilibrium strategies back into the profit functions (B.21) and (B.22), 
we obtain the second stage profit function   
      
      
    . Differentiating with respect to 
the locations yields from the Envelope Theorem that: 
(B.26)    
   
   
   
     
   
   
   
    
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
      
 
   
 
       
   
   
    
       
   
   
   
   
   
   
       
        ,  
(B.27)      
 
   
   
   
     
   
   
   
      
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
      
 
   
  
    
   
   
       
           
                                              
  
       
   
   
    
       
   
   
   
   
   
   
       
                           
 Substituting (B.23) and (B.24) in (B.19) yields: 
          (B.28)   
       
   
   
       
     
      
    
    
      
    
.        
  From (B.24): 
          (B.29)                 
   
   
   
      
  
     
 
   
   
 
     .       
  Substituting (B.23), (B.28) and (B.29) into (B.26) we obtain: 
           (B.30)        
    
  
   
 
    .         
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 According to (B.19)  
       
   
   
    =  
       
   
   
    .  Substituting in (B.27) the last relation, 
(B.24), (B.25), the fact that from (B.19)  
       
   
   
      
     
      
    
     
      
    
  and 
       
   
   
    
 
   
   
 
 
   
      
    
 , and from (B.23)  
   
   
   
    
   
     
 
  
       
 
  yields a quadratic equation 
in   
    as follows:    
(B.31)  
 
     
  
     
       
    
 
      
             
   
 
 
           
     .   
Solving (B.31) for   
    and choosing the root to ensure that 
   
   
    
     , we obtain 
  
    as given in (18). Substituting (18) in (B.30), we obtain   
    as expressed in (17). From 
these solutions, it follows that   
     
 
 
  , and    
    
 
 
  , since    
   
   . 
In order to demonstrate that   
       , we will first show that    
   
     . Note 
that the solution for    
   
 can be obtained implicitly as in the proof of Lemma 1 as follows: 
     
   
  
 
 
     
   
    
                     
   
 
 
   
             (B.32) 
where   
    is expressed in terms of    
   
 as in (18). Notice that 
         
 
   
        
 
        
   
 
 
             
  
 
 
        
     
Hence using the definition of function      from the proof of Lemma 1,            
        . Since the function defined in (B.32) is negative when evaluated at      and it should be 
equal to zero at    
   
 , it follows that    
   
       As a result, from (18)   
     
 
 
             
  
 
 
        
       
 
 
  . 
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Finally, substituting (17), (18), (B.23) and (B.24) into (B.19) yields: 
(B.33)         
        
 
 
           
   
 
 
        
        .               
 
Proof of Proposition 4:   
 Substituting (17), (18), (B.23), and (B.33) into (B.21) yields: 
  (B.34)     
    
   
        
            
   
 
 
        
  
 
      
Similarly, substituting (14) and (16) into (9) we get:  
(B.35)     
  
   
  
     
     
  
       
             
 
           
   
 
         
              
  
   
    
From (B.35)   
     
     
  
     
    
 
, and since the firms are symmetric   
   
  
     as well. Since from the proof of Proposition 3,      
   
     , it follows that: 
(B.36) 
  
     
     
  
 
  
 
    
   
 
 
       
              
 
           
   
 
         
              
                 
   
 
        
  
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
     
 . 
The second term subtracted inside the parenthesis of (B.36) is:  
(B.37)
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 (B.37) decreases with     .  Therefore at       , it obtains its maximum value of 
                   
  
 
  
 
 which is less than    
 
 when        . Thus,   
     
     . 
Note that   
    
       
   
 
   
   
        
    
   
       
    
   
   
                                            
 
       
   
 
   
   
       
    
   
       
    
   
   
       
          
    
   
   
        
Substituting (17), (18), (B.24), and (B.33) into 
          
    
   
   
       implies   
     
  
       
             
   
 
 
        
                
   
 
 
        
  
 
   
    
      
  
     
   
 
.  
 
Proof of Corollary 1:   
Notice that when      ,       
   Therefore, in our formulation,  choosing       is 
equivalent to not expanding the product line. From Proposition 4 we know that when one 
newspaper does not expand, the other chooses to expand. Hence, the outcome         
cannot correspond to an equilibrium. We also know from Proposition 4 that when one newspaper 
expands, the other chooses to expand as well.  Therefore, in equilibrium each newspaper chooses 
a positive   .  
 
Proof of Proposition 5:  
For ease of exposition we drop the superscript E,E in all the variables. When newspaper i 
chooses   
  , the cutoff points     are still given as in (6). However, because readers have no 
ability to affect   
  via UGC, they consider   
  exogenous. Specifically,  
(B.38)       
  
      
 
 
     
     
 
     
    
 .                                                                                                       
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  The expression for        remains as in (5) and the objectives of the firms are still given 
in (9) and (10). Optimizing with respect to    and    in Stage 3 and solving in terms of    and 
  
  yields for    a solution identical to (11) and for   :  
  (B.39)                   
      
 
 
  
       
      
      
     
  
 
  , 
                   
      
 
 
  
       
   
         
     
  
 
  .                 
         Substituting the expressions for    and    back into the expression for     in (B.38), 
yields that segmentation is feasible at the symmetric equilibrium, specifically at           
if:  
   (B.40)   
  
       
   
          
  
      
 
  
      
 
 
  
       
   
         
  
      
 
  .              
This implies from (B.39) that:            . In the second stage, each newspaper 
chooses    and   
 . For Newspaper 1, differentiating (9) with respect to     and   
  yields: 
(B.41)     
   
   
 
 
   
  
       
   
 
       
   
   
   
                        
    
   
 ,           
 (B.42)     
    
   
  
 
 
   
                
    
    
  ,                                                                                 
where        is given  in (5) and     in (B.38). Evaluating (B.41) and (B.42) at the symmetric 
equilibrium where         ,    
    
 ,         ,          , while using the equilibrium 
expressions for    and    from (11) and (B.39) yields: 
(B.43)    
   
   
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
        
   
 
 
    
  
      
 
  
  
   
 
 
 
 
       
  
       
 
      
 
   
            
    
        
                
      
   
   
  
 
   
                 
           
      
      
 
 
 
 
  
    
  
 
     
    
     
   .             
  92 
Assuming an interior equilibrium with    
       implies that 
   
   
   , and since 
              , 
 (B.44)     
      
 
     
  
 
 
  
 
  
     
     
  
       
 .                                                                        
Substituting (B.44) into (B.43) yields that: 
(B.45)      
   
   
 
 
   
    
    
 
 
         
         
     
  
  
       
 .          
To ensure segmentation, the lower bound on  
      
 
 from (B.40) should hold, which 
combined with (B.44) implies that   
    . Using the last inequality in (B.45) implies that 
   
   
   for all values of    and   
 . Hence, Newspaper 1 will choose the lowest bias consistent 
with   
      , implying that   
      and no segmentation arises. A similar argument 
holds also for Newspaper 2.  
 
 
Locations Chosen Before Expansion Decision:  
 If the timing of the decisions changed so that    were chosen first followed by the 
decision on whether to offer the online editions, there are circumstances under which the present 
equilibrium (   ,    ) would prevail. We now demonstrate these circumstances. 
First note that because of the discrete nature of the expansion decision in Stage 2, when a 
given newspaper contemplates unilaterally deviating from      or     in Stage 1, it does not 
anticipate that the competing newspaper or itself will change their expansion decisions, unless 
the deviation is sufficiently big. As we show in Proposition 4,   
     
    and   
     
    
when both newspapers choose focal points in the neighborhood of      and    . In order to 
make a deviation worthwhile it has to change the choice of the competitor or itself from E to NE 
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in the second stage. Such a unilateral deviation of Newspaper 1,      to    should yield that     
in (7) is equal to     or     in (8) is equal to   . From (7) if        , it follows that:  
(B.46)               
 
  
     
 
        
     
  
            ,                                                       
and from (12)                 when        .  
Substituting for        in (B.46) and solving it for    yields: 
  (B.47)        
       
 
 
 
   
.                                                                                                                   
To support the equilibrium we derive in the study, Lemma 1 asserts that: 
  
      
 
  
    
                              
   
  
 
. 
Substituting the lower bound on   back into (B.47), yields that:     
 
 
  . Hence, in 
order to change its own expansion to NE Newspaper 1 will have to make its print edition more 
extreme. Next, we derive the condition necessary to make such a large deviation unprofitable. 
After deviating to   , by using (11) in (5) one can derive the new expression for the value of 
       as:        
      
 
 . Then from (9) and (11) the profits of Newspaper 1 after the deviation 
are:  
(B.48)          
  
 
   
 
      
 
     
  
     
         
      
 
      ,               
where      
       
 
 
 
   
  from (B.47).  
From (B.35) 
  
   
  
     
     
  
       
             
 
           
   
 
         
              
  
   
     
and from (16)     
 
   
         
 
        
  .   
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Hence, 
       
      
 
 
        
 
   
    
        
 
   
       
 
    
 
   
 
.  
Substituting for        and  
      into (B.48) yields:  
(B.49)       
  
  
       
 
        
 
   
    
       
 
     
 
   
 
    
 
 
 
   
        
 
    
        
 
 
  
 
   
 .  
A comparison of (B.35) and (B.49), yields that there are values of       
  
 
     under 
which   
       
 
, implying that the large deviation to    is unprofitable for Newspaper 1.  
Note that when    is chosen prior to the expansion decision of the newspapers, 
Newspaper 1 cannot induce     to be equal to   . According to (8), the value of     is only a 
function of    and not   . Hence, for a fixed value of     
  , any unilateral deviation of 
Newspaper 1 will not change    . 
 
Expansion of Readership Facilitated by Online Editions: In this section we demonstrate that 
the profits of each newspaper may rise with the introduction of an online edition, if in the 
absence of offering such editions the market of readers is not fully covered. In Figure 7 we depict 
this possibility. 
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Figure 7: Market Less Than Fully Covered When Only the Print Version is Offered 
 
Less than full coverage implies that the expected utility of readers with very extreme 
political opinions is negative when newspapers offer only print editions, namely         for 
      and      , and          for           . Readers located at     and     are just 
indifferent between buying the print edition of newspapers 1 and 2, respectively, and 
withdrawing from the market. Solving for     and     yields:  
(B.50)     
   
     
  
    
 
      
    
    
 
   
   
 
      
   
   
     
   ,            
                     
   
     
  
    
 
      
    
    
 
   
   
 
      
   
   
     
   . 
Note that the expressions in the brackets included in the radicals of (B.50) are positive, 
since the expected utility of a reader located at b=0 is positive according to Figure 7. Hence,     
    
    
     
   and      
     
     
. The objectives of the two newspapers are:    
(B.51)                
                   
   
 ;               
                   
   
.            
 
Withdraw from 
the Market 
Buy print edition 
of Newspaper 1 
Buy print edition 
of Newspaper 2 
 
Withdraw from 
the market 
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Optimizing with respect to     yields at the symmetric equilibrium when          , 
         ,         , and             that: 
(B.52)            
       
           
  
     
 
          
  
     
 
   and       
      
      
         
   
,                                                    
where the subscript less in (B.52) indicates that the market is less than fully covered. It is 
possible to find an upper bound on the equilibrium profits in (B.52). Specifically,  
(B.53)       
              
 
.                           
Now, assume that extending the product mix by introducing the online edition allows the 
newspapers to cover the entire market. Specifically, the expected utility of readers located at 
     and     is strictly positive at the {E, E} equilibrium. Hence,          when reader    is 
exposed to the bias        and pays the fee    . From (B.35), it is possible to derive a lower 
bound on the expected profits of each newspaper for the region of   values that support 
segmentation, as specified in Lemma 1. Specifically,  
 (B.54)      
     
     
   
            
A comparison of (B.53) with (B.53) implies that the expansion of the readership that is 
facilitated by the extension of the product mix will definitely increase the profits of each 
newspaper provided that         , namely that readers are not overly concerned about 
inaccurate reporting. Note that this condition does not contradict the requirement for less than 
full coverage in the absence of segmentation. A necessary condition for the latter is that     . 
Hence, there is a nonempty interval of values for the ratio 
 
 
 that is consistent with the result that  
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introducing the online edition may increase the profits of the newspapers. This increase in profits 
is different from the result reported in Proposition 4, when the market was fully covered even in 
the absence of segmentation.  
 
An Additional Dimension of Heterogeneity among Readers:  
In this section we extend our model by allowing for a second dimension of heterogeneity 
among readers with respect to their preference for the print versus the online editions unrelated 
to political opinions. This preference may be related, for instance, to the age of the reader, with 
younger readers usually preferring the online edition, and older readers being more comfortable 
with the traditional, print edition. Specifically, we assume that the expected utility of a young 
reader increases by         and that of an older reader decreases by       when choosing the 
online edition. Modifying (3) we obtain:  
     
       =    
 
  
  
   
    
    
 
  
  
   
      
       
                              
  
  
   
    
    
 
  
  
   
      
       
                           
      
With the above modified expected utility, the threshold reader who is indifferent between 
the online and print editions of a given newspaper is different for the young and old populations. 
Specifically,    
   
    
     
 and    
   
    
     
 . For Newspaper 2, for instance, adjusting 
(8) yields:  
   
     
  
           
     
 
     
          
     
 
              
     
  
     
 , 
         
   
  
           
     
 
     
          
     
 
             
     
  
     
 . 
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We assume that the populations of young and old readers are still each uniformly 
distributed on the interval [-     ] according to their political opinions, and that these 
distributions are independent of age. The proportions of young and old in the general population 
of readers are (1-q) and q, respectively. We derive Proposition WA.1 from this modified model.  
 
PROPOSITION WA.1: When there exists an additional dimension of reader heterogeneity, 
unrelated to political opinions, each newspaper chooses to intensify the bias of its print edition 
and the expected size of the online segment declines. Moreover, when the variability in the 
population that is unrelated to political opinions increases ( i.e., when        and         
          are bigger), the polarization of the newspapers becomes more significant. Polarization 
remains, however, more moderate than in an environment with only print editions. 
 
Proof: We drop the superscript E,E to simplify the notation, and write the objective of 
Newspaper 2 as: 
   
 
   
       
   
                       
   
             
                 
     
   
      
     
                       
     
           .  
A similar expression can be derived for the objective of Newspaper 1. Using an approach 
similar to that leading to the first order condition (B.16), yields that the optimization with respect 
to    in the second stage can be expressed as: 
(B.55)       
   
   
 
        
  
  
          
     
          
 
  
     
 
    
      
          
  
         
 
                      
   
    
     
 
 
     
                      
     
         
   
 
    ,        
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where            
   
         
     
. The first term of (B.55) coincides with the first order 
condition (B.16) that was derived when politics was the only differentiating attribute among 
readers, with the only difference being that        replaces    
  
 in (B.16). The second term is 
positive, and measures the extent of heterogeneity between the young and old populations. This 
second term is bigger when the variance due to the different ages in the general population is 
bigger (the product       ) and when the difference     
   
    
     
  is more significant (as 
implied by the different values of         and      .) Evaluating (B.55) at the point when 
          
  
 implies that  
   
   
  , hence Newspaper 2 has to increase    beyond   
   in 
order to satisfy the first order condition (B.55). Hence, bias intensifies, and since    and        
move in the same direction,           
  
 
 
In addition note that  
  
              
          
             
          
   
    
     
 
 
     
                      
     
         
   
 
     
because the term inside the brackets is positive and bigger than    
 
 
 
 
       
 , given that 
       
  
 
,     
   
    
     
  
  
 
, and      . As a result, to satisfy (B.55)  
     
 
    
  
 , implying that at the equilibrium    is still smaller than  
 
 
  . In addition, the expected 
equilibrium profits are still smaller when both editions are offered given that the newspapers 
would not choose segmentation according to politics if they had full control over the attributes of 
both editions.  
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The result reported in Proposition WA.1 is consistent with that reported in Proposition 5. 
According to Proposition 5, if newspapers could fully control the bias of their online editions, 
they would choose it to be identical to the bias of their print editions. Once some of this control 
is transferred to readers via UGC, the political segmentation of readers leads to intensified bias 
of the online version and reduced bias of the print version. However, if there is additional 
heterogeneity among readers that is unrelated to politics, newspapers can move closer to the 
outcome they would choose if they had full control over the characteristics of the online editions. 
Specifically, while the bias of the print version      remains smaller than 
 
 
   , it moves closer 
to this value. As well, the segment of consumers who choose the more biased online editions 
shrinks. Moreover, as the variability in the population that is unrelated to political opinions 
increases, the equilibrium moves closer to that described in Proposition 5, when newspapers 
have the exclusive right to choose the online bias.  
 
 
  101 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Accenture (2007), “User-Generated Content Is Top Threat To Media And Entertainment 
Industry, Accenture Survey Finds,” 
http://newsroom.accenture.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=4534.  
 
Armstrong, Mark (2006), “Competition in Two-Sided Markets,” RAND Journal of 
Economics, 37 (3), 668-91. 
 
Baron, David (2006), “Persistent Media Bias,” Journal of Public Economics, 90(1-2): 1-
36. 
 
Belk, Russell W. (1988), “Possessions and the Extended Self,” Journal of  Consumer 
Research, 15 (2), 139-68.  
 
Bernhardt, Dan, Stefan Krasa, and Mattias Polborn (2008),  “Political Polarization and 
the Electoral Effects of Media Bias,” Journal of Public Economics, 92(5-6): 1092-1104. 
Bergemann, Dirk and Alessandro Bonatti (2010), “Targeting in Advertising Markets: 
Implications for Offline vs. Online Media,” Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1758,Yale 
University. 
 
Brander, James and Jonathan Eaton (1984), “Product Line Rivalry,” American Economic 
Review, 74(3), 323-334. 
 
Champsaur, Paul and Jean Rochet (1989),“Multiproduct Duopolists.” Econometrica, 
57(3), 533-557. 
 
Chen, Yubo and Jinhong Xie (2008), “Online Consumer Review: Word-Of-Mouth as a 
New Element of Marketing Communication Mix,” Management Science, 54(3), 477-491. 
 
Chevalier, Judith and Dina Mayzlin (2006), “The Effect of Word of Mouth on Sales: 
Online Book Reviews,” Journal of Marketing Research, 43(3), 345-354. 
 
Clark, Andrew (2010), “New York Times to Charge Readers for Online Content,” The 
Guardian (January 20), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/jan/20/new-york-times-charging-
content-online.  
 
  102 
Desai, Preyas (2001), “Quality Segmentation in Spatial Markets: When Does 
Cannibalization Affect Product Line Design?” Marketing Science, 20(3) 265-283. 
 
Dhar, Vasant and Elaine A. Chang (2009), “Does Chatter Matter? The Impact Of User-
Generated Content On Music Sales,” Journal of Interactive Marketing. 23(4) 300-307. 
 
Economist (2010), “Media‟s Two Tribes,” (July 1), http://www.economist.com/node/ 
16486717?story_id=16486717&CFID=142923580&CFTOKEN=64385541. 
 
Ellman, Matthew and Fabrizio Germano (2009), “What do the Papers Sell? A Model of 
Advertising and Media Bias,” Economic Journal, 119 (537), 680-704. 
 
Gabszewicz, Jean J., Didier Laussel, and Nathalie Sonnac (2002), “Press Advertising and 
the Political Differentiation of Newspapers,” Journal of Public Economic Theory, 4 (3), 317-34. 
 
Gentzkow, Matthew (2007), “Valuing New Goods in a Model with Complementarity: 
Online Newspapers,” American Economic Review, 97(3), 713-744. 
 
Gentzkow, Matthew and Jesse M. Shapiro (2006), “Media Bias and Reputation,” Journal 
of Political Economy, 114 (2), 280-316. 
 
Gilbert, Richard J. and Carmen Matutes (1993), “Product Line Rivalry with Brand 
Differentiation,” Journal of Industrial Economy, 41(3), 223-240. 
 
Godes, David and Dina Mayzlin (2004), “Using Online Conversations to Study Word-of-
Mouth Communication,” Marketing Science, 23(4) 545-560.  
 
Groseclose, Tim and Jeffrey Milyo (2005), “A Measure of Media Bias,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 120 (4), 1191-1237. 
 
Guo, Liang (2006), “Consumption Flexibility, Product Configuration, and Market 
Competition,” Marketing Science, 25 (2), 116-130. 
 
Iyer, Ganesh, David Soberman and J. Miguel Villas-Boas (2005), “The Targeting of 
Advertising,” Marketing Science, 24 (3), 461-76. 
 
Katz, Michael L. (1984), “Firm-Specific Differentiation and Competition Among 
Multiproduct Firms,” Journal of Business, 57(1) Part 2: Pricing Strategy  S149-S166.  
 
Kuksov, Dmitri and Ron Shachar (2010), “Advertising and Consumers' 
Communications,” Working paper, University of Washington at St. Louis. 
 
Lee, Edward (2008), “Warming up to User Generated Content.,” University of Illinois 
Law Review, No. 5, 1460-1548. 
 
  103 
Liu, Yong (2006), “Word of Mouth for Movies: its Dynamics and Impact on Box Office 
Revenue,” Journal of Marketing, 70(3) 74-89. 
 
Mayzlin, Dina (2006), “Promotional Chat on the Internet,” Marketing Science, 25(2), 
155-163. 
 
Miller, Dale T. and Kimberly Rios Morrison (2009), “Expressing Deviant Opinions: 
Believing you are in Majority Helps,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45(4) 740-
747. 
 
Moorthy, K. Sridhar, (1987), “Product Line Competition,” Annals of 
Telecommunications, 42(11-12), 655-663. 
 
Morrison, Kimberly Rios and Dale. T. Miller, (2008), “Distinguishing between Silent and 
Vocal Minorities: not All Deviants Feel Marginal,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 94(5) 871-882. 
 
Mullainathan, Sendhil and Andrei Shleifer (2005), “The Market for News,” American 
Economic Review, 95 (4), 1031-53. 
 
OECD. 2007. Participative web and user-created content: Web 2.0., wikis, and social 
networking, http://213.253.134.43/oecd/pdfs/browseit/9307031E.pdf.  
 
Sass, Erik. 2009. News Analysis: Why Kindle Can‟t Save Newspapers. Mediapost, May 
11. http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&art_aid=105858.  
 
Sarvary, Miklos and Philip Parker (1997), “Marketing Information: A Competitive 
Analysis,” Marketing Science, 16 (1), 24-38. 
 
Schmidt-Mohr, Udo and J. Miguel Villas-Boas (2008), “Competitive Product Lines With 
Quality Constraints,” Quantitative Marketing and Economics,” 6(1), 1-16. 
 
Strömberg, David (2004) “Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public 
Policy,” Review of Economic Studies, 71 (1), 265-84. 
 
Trusov, Michael, Richard E. Bucklin, and Koen Pauwels (2009), “Estimating the 
Dynamic Effects of Online Word-Of-Mouth on Member Growth of a Social Network Site,” 
Journal Marketing, 73(5), 90-102. 
 
Verna, Paul (2009), “A Spotlight on UGC Participants,” 
http://www.emarketer.com/Article.aspx?R=1006914. 
 
Xiang, Yi and Miklos Sarvary (2007), “News Consumption and Media Bias,” Marketing 
Science, 26 (5), 611-28. 
 
  104 
Zhu, Feng and Xiaoquan Zhang (2010), “Impact of Online Consumer Reviews on Sales: 
the Moderating Role of Product and Consumer Characteristics,” Journal of Marketing, 74(2), 
133-14. 
